E 

-415 


BANCROFT 

LIBRARY 

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OF 

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OF  CALIFORNIA 


VINDICATION 

MAJOR  GENERAL  °JOHN  C.  EREMONT 

AGAINST 

E    ATTACKS    OF    THE     SLAVE    POWER    AND    ITS    ALLIES, 

BY 

HON.  JOHN  P.  C.  SHANKS, 

OB1  INDIANA, 

IN    THE     HOUSE     OF     HE  PRE  SENT  ATI  VES  , 
TUESDAY,  MARCH  4,  1862. 


VINDICATION 


MAJOR  GENERAL  JOHN  C.  FREMONT, 


AGAINST 


THE  ATTACKS  OF  THE  SLAVE  POWER  AND  ITS  ALLIES, 


BY 
°<UV        CUver 


HON.  JOHN  PT&  SHANKS, 

//  7 

OF  INDIANA, 

IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES, 


TUESDAY,  MARCH  4,  1862. 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

iCAMMELL  &  CO.,  PSIKTERS,  CORNER  OF  INDIANA  AVENUE  AND  SECOND  STREET,  SBD  FLOOR. 

1862. 


E  '4  / 


.  F  8-  '  S 


BANCROFT 
LIBRARY 


SPEECH 


The  House  being  in  Committee  of  the  Whol 
on  the  state  of  the  Union — 

Mr.  SHANKS  said: 

Mr.  CHAIRMAN  :  It  is  with  feelings  of  much 
anxiety  that  I  arise,  under  the  peculiar  circum 
stances  which  surround  me,  to  address  this 
House  on  the  subjects  before  it. 

My  purpose  is  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
committee  to  some  of  the  matters  contained  in 
the  "  Report  in  part "  of  the  committee  on  con 
tracts,  of  which  the  gentleman  from  New  York 
[Mr.  VAN  WYCK]  is  chairman,  only,  however 
so  far  as  they  relate  to  General  John  C.  Fre 
mont,  and  then  only  to  a  part  of  those  at  this 
time,  as  I  intend,  if  possible,  to  take  those 
subjects  in  detail  when  that  report  and  accom 
panying  resolutions  may  come  before  us. 

This  "  Report  in  part "  was  made  on  the 
17th  day  of  December,  and  has  been  sent 
from  this  House  to  all  parts  of  the  country. 
Its  consideration  has  been  deferred  from  time 
to  time,  until  some  ten  days  ago  it  passed 
from  its  character  of  a  special  order  to  a  special 
privilege  in  the  hands  of  the  committee. 

The  country  has  had  the  charges  for  over 
two  months,  and  yet  not  a  word  of  defence  from 
those  whose  characters  have  been  challenged 
on  testimony  taken  without  notice  to  them. 
Bnt  since  I  am  compelled  to  speak  in  Com 
mittee  of  the  Whole,  1  shall  take  the  privilege 
thus  offered  me  to  draw  attention  to  matters  of 
more  general  importance  to  the  country,  as 
connected  with  him  of  whom  I  shall  speak 
to-day,  still  hoping  that  the  time  may  come 
when  the  matters  named  in  the  report  to 
which  I  have  referred  shall  be  well  known  to 
the  House  and  the  country. 

The  only  subject  among  the  several  named 
by  the  committee,  touching  the  administrative 
character  of  General  Fremont,  which  they  think 
worthy  to  ask  special  action  by  the  House  upon, 
is  in  relation  to  the  purchase  by  him,  as 
commander  of  the  Western  Department,  for 
service  in  his  cavalry,  of  5,000  new  cast-steel 


breech-loading  Hall's  carbines,  of  Simon  Ste 
vens  for  the  sum  of  $22  apiece.  This  pattern 
of  arm  was  approved  years  ago,  and  adopted 
as  a  Government  weapon  ;  and  I  learn  that  a 
manufactory  for  its  fabrication  was  established 
at  Harper's  Ferry,  Va.  A  copy  of  the  army 
regulations  of  1835  now  before  me  gives  the  cost 
in  detail  of  this  arm  for  material  and  manufac 
ture  at  $21  5  they  were  then  smooth  bored. 
On  the  6th  day  of  June,  1861,  General  Ripley, 
chief  of  the  ordnance  bureau,  of  this  Govern 
ment,  claiming  to  act  under  an  order  from  the 
War  Department,  which  very  order  the  com 
mittee  say  his  bureau  recommended,  sold  to  a 
Mr.  Eastman  5,400  of  these  arms  for  the  sum 
of  $3  50  each — just  one-sixth  their  original 
cost  to  the  Government.  Eastman  had  pro 
posed  to  Ripley  for  an  average  of  $1  apiece, 
to  chamber  and  rifle  these  carbines  in  the  style 
of  the  latest  improved  arm,  but  Ripley  refused 
it,  and  got  the  order  on  the  recommendation  of 
his  own  department,  and  sold  them  as  above 
stated.  General  Fremont,  sorely  pressed  for 
arms,  having  none  for  his  cavalry,  and  his  en 
tire  command  in  need  of  early  organization, 
wholly  neglected  by  the  Government,  as  I  will 
abundantly  prove  as  I  go  along,  received  by 
telegraph  from  Stevens  the  following  despatch : 

NawYoRK,  Augusts,  1861. 

I  have  5,000  Hall's  rifled  cast-steel  carbines,  breech-load 
ing,  new,  at  twenty-two  dollars,  government  standard, 
58-100  bore.  Can  I  hear  from  you  ? 

SIMON  STEVENS. 
J.  C.  FREMONT. 
J/aj.  Gen.,  Com'g  Dep't  of  Che  West,  Cairo,  III. 

To  which  the  following  is  an  answer ; 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

St.  Louis,  August  Q,  1861. 

I  will  take  the  whole  5,000  carbines.  See  agent  Adams' 
Express,  and  send  by  express  ;  not  fast  freight.  I  will  pay 
ill  extra  charges.  Send  also  ammunition.  Devote  yourself 
solely  to  that  business  to-day. 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 
Major  General  Commanding. 
SIMON  STEVENS,  New  York. 

This  is  a  contract,  and  if  honorably  made  by 
the  Government's  agent,  it  cannot  now  afford 


to  violate  it ;  but  in  this  case  I  only  desire  to 
lay  the  fault  and  blame  where  they  belong  ;  for 
I  agree  with  the  committee  that  there  has. beeji 
a  most  damnable  fraud  committed  agaiii$  Hre 
Government,  but  I  now  insist  and  will  go  on 
to  prove  that  General  Ripley  is  the  man  who 
has  by  his  most  unaccountable  liberality  with 
her  much-needed  arms,  wronged  the  Govern 
ment  out  of  them  for  a  nominal  sum.  The 
law  provides  as  found  "  United  States  military 
laws,"  on  page  292,  approved  March  3d,  1825, 
as  follows : 

"  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he  is 
hereby,  authorized  to  cause  to  be  sold  any  ordnance, 
arms,  ammunition,  or  other  military  stores  or  subsistence, 
or  medical  supplies,  which  upon  proper  inspection  or  sur 
vey,  shall  appear  to  be  damaged,  or  otherwise  unsuitable 
for  the  public  service,  whenever  in  his  opiuion,  the  sale  of 
such  unserviceable  stores  will  be  advantageous  to  the  pub 
lic  service." 

It  becomes  a  question  whether  the  President 
has  in  the  pressing  need  for  arms  during  a  war 
like  the  one  now  upon  us,  ordered  to  be  sold 
arms  which  General  Ripley  himself  in  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Eastman  under  date  of  June  20,  in 
forming  him  where  to.  get  the  carbines  which 
were  at  arsenals  on  Governor's  Island,  N.  Y., 
and  Frankfort,  Philadelphia,  saying  that  East 
man  was  to  have  '*  all  of  the  Hall's  carbines  of 
every  description  (serviceable  and  unservice 
able)  on  hand,  at  the  rate  of  $3  50  each."  I 
do  not  believe  that  the  President  did  give  such 
order;  if  he  did  it  was  on  the  recommendation 
of  the  department  contracting  them  5  and  I  am 
well  convinced  that  the  President  did  not  order 
serviceable  carbines  at  that  time  to  be  sold  at 
that  price. 

The  army  regulations  under  date  of  August 
10,  1861,  gives  the  price  of  Hall's  carbines,  at 
$17  as  the  cost  of  material  and  manufacture, 
which  is  four  dollars  less  than  in  1835 — 
owing  to  the  improvement  in  machinery. 
The  carbine  will  shoot  as  well  now  as  then, 
when  made  in  the  same  way ;  but  in  looking 
over  the  list  of  prices  of  small  arms  manufac 
tured  by  the  Government,  as  found  on  pages 
394  and  395,  Army  Regulations,  August  "l9, 
1861,  they  are  as  follows:  Musket,  $13;  rifle, 
$13.25  ;  Hall's  carbines,  $17  ;  artillery  muske- 
toon,  $10.37;  cavalry  musketoon,  $1 1 ;  sappers' 
musketoon.  $10.62;  pistol,  $7.  But  some  of  those 
same  carbines  were  purchased  here,  by  those  who 
sold  them  for  $15.  Before  Fremont  purchased 
those  5,000,  they  were  all  chambered  and 
rifled,  making  them  a  superior  cavalry  piece  ; 
and  they  are  now  in  service  by  Halleek's 
cavalry,  having  been  armed  by  Fremont  when 
he  commanded.  Now  this  committee  ask  this 
House  to  recommend  the  Treasury  to  only 
pay  $12.50  for  those  purchased  by  Fremont, 
when  the  army  regulations,  dated  four  days  after 
the  purchase,  give  the  price,  as  shown,  at 
$17.  The  committee  propose  to  allow  $4.50 
less  than  the  material  and  manufacture,  with 
out  the  rifling  and  chambering  costs,  showing 
simply  that  the  committee  have  not  understood 


the  case.  Ripley  sold  them  for  $13.50  apiece 
less  than  the  regulations  of  August,  1861,  fix 
the,  actual  cost,  when  there  was  no  pressing 
*heed  for  sale,  and  Fremont  gave  after  they 
were  altered  $5  more  apiece  than  the  Govern 
ment  price  then,  and  only  one  dollar  more 
than  the  Government  price  when  he  had  been 
in  service ;  yet  the  committee  say  that  "  General 
Ripley  is  a  gentleman  of  large  experience,  and 
inexorable  in  the  performance  of  his  public 
duties."  On  the  12th  of  April,  1861,  the  enemy 
attacked  Fort  Sumter — on  the  14th  it  surrender 
ed.  On  the  15th  the  President  called  for  75,000 
men  to  quell  the  rebellion,  all  of  whom  would 
need  arms.  On  the  19th  the  traitors  in  Balti 
more  killed  our  unarmed  troops  in  the  streets. 
On  the  6th  of  June,  the  "inexorable"  Ripley, 
on  what  he  claims  as  authority  from  the  War 
Department,  grounded  on  a  recommendation 
from  his  own  department,  and  all  in  viola 
tion  of  law,  sold  5,400  carbines,  for  $3.50 
each,  which  the  regulation  of  1835  tells  us  are 
worth  $21  each,  and  the  regulation  published 
August  10th,  1861,  sixty-four  days  after  the 
s  lie,  gives  the  cost  of  manufacture  at  $17.  On 
the  16th  of  June  we  lose  Harper's  Ferry  where 
they  were  made,  and  surrender  to  the  enemy 
all  the  arms  there,  with  the  machinery.  On  the 
20th  of  June  the  carbines  are  still  in  the  arse 
nals,  not  paid  for  and  not  delivered.  Ripley,  by 
written  orders,  directed  that  all,  serviceable  and 
unserviceable,  be  delivered  to  Eastman,  at  $3.50 
— subsequently  buying  790  of  them  at  $15. 

On  August  6th,  General  Fremont,  needing 
arms  for  men  who  were  ready  to  defend  a  vast 
department,  purchased  5,000  of  them  at  $22 
in  open  market,  where  the  Government  officers 
had  thrown  them  contrary  to  law,  but  of  which 
he  knew  nothing.  On  the  10th  of  August,  four 
days  after  his  purchase,  the  very  department 
which  sold  them  at  $3  50,  report  them  at  $17 
cost  of  manufacturing  in  Government  arsenals. 
Yet  you  condemn  Fremont  and  endorse  Ripley, 
after  you  have  said  that  the  carbines  were  sold 
in  the  fir.-t  place  "  privately."  I  think  that  the 
committee  will  do  justice  when  they  see  these 
things  in  their  true  light. 

But  the  committee  inform  us  the  Ordnance 
Bureau,  at  whose  head  is  General  Ripley,  in 
time  of  war  r-.commends  the  sale,  and  sells, 
without  law,  for  one-fifth  their  value,  as  shown 
by  the  books  of  his  own  office,  five  thousand 
four  hundred  stand  of  arms,  with  a  loss  to  the 
Government  of  near  $73,000,  and  holds  his 
office  still — and  who  is  endorsed  by  the  com 
mittee. 

Inexperienced,  I  now  approach  with  hesitancy 
to  attack  the  cordon  of  fortifications  thrown  by 
experienced  hands  across  the  pathways  of  an 
honest,  pure,  devoted  patriot  for  his  destruc 
tion,  to  satisfy  the  ambition  of  base  and  cor 
rupt  men,  who,  instead  of  supporting  him, 
have  seized  upon  the  wisdom  of  his  recorded 
councils  and  the  armies  and  fleets  by  him 
spoken  into  existence,  from  which  to  gather 


5 


the  laurels  due  his  rightful  victories  to 
wreathe  their  brows,  while  he  wears  a  crown  of 
thorns. 

My  purpose  is  to  do  an  act  of  justice  to  one 
who,  though  his  name  and  honor  stands  con 
nected  with  this  report  and  resolution,  was  not 
notified,  nor  could  bave  been  present,  when  the 
extra  judicial  examination  was  had  by  the  com 
mittee  upon  which  they  are  based.  Nor  can  he 
be  here  now  to  defend  himself  upon  this  floor, 
against  the  uujast  charges  and  inferences  con 
tained  in  them,  against  that  name  which  has 
in  this  country  long  been  a  household  word, 
synonymous  with  freedom,  loveu  at  home,  hon 
ored  and  respected  abroad. 

I  well  recollect  how  the  grateful  thanks  of 
our  Western  people  went  forth  10  meet  the  Pres 
ident,  for  the  appointment  of  the  brave  and  gen 
erous  Fremont  to  the  office  of  Major  General, 
and  in  command  of  the  Western  Department; 
how  with  one  "accord  our  young  men  rallied  to 
the  support  of  the  Union,  with  the  cheering 
hope  that  he  should  command  them.  The  ener 
gy  and  perseverance  of  the  people  of  our  West 
ern  States  have  no  just  comparisons  among 
men.  It  w#s  not  strange,  then,  that  they  should 
look  with  pride  and  hope  to  a  commander  whose 
courage,  energy,  and  devotion  to  liberty,  are 
proverbial  throughout  the  civilized  world. 

I  recollect  how  it  was  proclaimed  through 
the  public  journals,  that  he  was  the  right  man, 
in  the  right  place. 

That  as  this  war  was  the  result  of  slavery's 
treason,  freedom's  patriotic  defender  was  our 
proper  commander. 

Our  Western  people  are  plain  in  manners, 
devoted  in  thought,  and  prompt  in  action. 
With  one  hope  we  entered  our  country's  ser 
vice  ;  politics  were  forgotten  among  us ;  our 
minds  recalled,  and  our  tongues  retold  the 
scenes  of  his  past  life,  and  rejoiced  that  the  hour 
was  nigh  when  (as  we  then  hoped  and  believed) 
he  should  lead  us  to  battle. 

Nor  have  the  people  been  deceived  by  the 
many  causeless  and  unjust  efforts  made  by 
designing  persons  to  destroy  their  confidence 
in  one  of  the  ablest  generals  in  the  American 
army,  and  the  boldest  friend  of  freedom  in  the 
Government  service. 

Conceal  it  as  you  may,  misname  it  as  you 
will,  the  elements  which  have  combined  for 
General  Fremont's  destruction,  are  too  ap 
parent  to  deceive  the  common  sense  and  quick 
perception  of  our  intelligent  and  patriotic  peo 
ple.  They  see  it  successfully  developed  in  the 
designs  of  the  slave  power,  as  manifested  to 
wards  him  by  its  leaders  since  his  proclama 
tion  to  the  people  of  Missouri,  of  August  30, 
1861 — in  a  combination  of  long-known,  under 
mining  politicians,  and  in  a  bigoted  military 
jealousy.  We  well  know  that  General  Fremont 
was  given  his  high  rank  in  the  army  in  obedi 
ence  to  the  loudly  and  universally  expressed 
wish  of  the  people,  who  desired  when  the  Re 
publican  party  came  into  power  that  the  ser 


vices  of  its  first  representative,  the  man  who 
had  welded  it  together,  under  whom  it  had 
won  its  victories  in  '56,  should  be  recognised. 
Against  this  wish  to  distinguish  one  of  them 
selves,  the  very  men  whom  the  people  had  ed 
ucated  into  their  positions,  have  set  themselves 
in  violent  opposition,  because  he  had  not  re 
ceived  with  them  the  rite  of  infant  baptism  at 
West  Point. 

Having  from  my  youth  learned  to  combat 
the  world's  wrongs  and  neglects  and  contend 
with  its  privations,  I  condemn  the  ingratitude 
of  this  class  toward  him,  who  only  asks  of  the 
Government  that  he  be  allowed  to  continue  in 
the  active  service  of  his  country,  leaving  impar 
tial  history  to  determine  between  West  Point 
and  Western  patriotism. 

There  are  some  chronological  events  which, 
when  understood  and  recollected,  will  ma 
terially  aid  in  elucidating  the  positions  I  am 
taking  in  this  case,  as  well  as  the  action  of 
those  who  strive  with  so  much  zeal  to  crush 
out  every  rising  hope  of  him  whom  they  have 
thus  far  practically  victimized  to  their  ungen 
erous  purposes. 

All  will   recollect  the  wide-spread  national 
joy  which  pervaded   all  classes  of  pure,  un 
conditional    Union-loving  citizens,   when   the 
lightnings   told   by    telegraph    that    Fremont 
would  take  command  in  our  army.     He  was, 
by    those    who    now     denounce    him,     then 
the   brilliant,    able,   and   patriotic  son  of  the 
West,  full  of  mind,  energy,  military  skill,  and 
promise ;  and,  in  fact,  these  attributes  were  his 
before  his  promotion  to  command.     So  by  the 
recognition  of  all  men,  and  the  contrary  was 
not  announced  until  his  hand  had  written  the 
proclamation  of  August  30,  1861,  a  portion  of 
which  is  in  the  following  memorable  words, 
and  which  places  his  name  in  history  honor 
ably,  and  in  most  pleasing  unity  with  his  life 
from  his  earlier  adventures  when  he  saved  the 
State  of  California  to  freedom. 
Bat  to  the  proclamation  : 
"  The  property,  real  and  personal,  of  all  per 
sons  in  the  State  of  Missouri,  who  shall  lake 
up  arms  against  the  United   States,  or  who 
shall  be  directly  proven  to  have  taken  active 
part  with  their   enemies  in  the  field,  is  de 
clared   to  be  coiifiscat3d  to  the  public    use, 
and  their  slaves,  if  any  they  have,  are  hereby 
declared  free  met,." 

This  was  the  head  and  front  of  his  offending — 
the  key  note  on  which  rallied  all  the  clans  in 
combination  against  him.  It  was  but  a  few 
hours  after  he  had  said  that  traitors'  property 
should  help  to  pay  the  expenses  of  the  war, 
forced  on  us  by  them,  and  that  their  slaves 
should  be  free,  until  from  Kentucky  and  Mis 
souri,  from  the  friends  of  slavery,  who  have  not 
risked  their  lives  in  this  war,  came  invectives 
against  him  and  in  favor  of  the  cause  which 
wrongs  us. 

Prior  to  this  time,  neglect  of  the  Western 
department  and  Western  men  had  been  the 


6 


only  clue  to  his  defeat,  then  apparent  to  those 
who,  for  sinister  motives,  sought  his  ruin. 

The  proclamation  was  the  opening  door  at 
which  his  enemies  entered  and  made  common 
cause  against  him.  The  politician  who  fears 
his  popularity  ;  the  friend  to  slavery,  who  pre 
fer  that  institution  even  in  rebel  hands,  to  the 
life  and  prosperity  of  free,  true,  and  just  men, 
at  field,  camp,  or  homestead  ;  the  military 
bigot,  who  sees  West  Point  first,  and  after  it,  the 
country ;  and  lastly,  speculators  at  the  public 
Treasury,  who,  themselves  guilty  and  suspected, 
point  the  finger  of  distrust  at  others — these 
are  the  classes  in  unholy  combination  against 
an  honest  and  pure  man,  whom  they  cannot 
control,  but  hope  to  destroy;  and  on  the  princi 
ple  that  a  large  shelter  protects  more  certainly 
from  the  storm,  the  attack  is  made  on  a 
popular  man  to  more  effectually  draw  public 
attention,  while  his  assailants  running  under 
cover  of  this  temporay  check  in  the  current  of 
public  thought,  in  the  armistice  thus  falsely 
obtained,  consummate  their  combined  grasp  of 
public  power,  regardless  of  the  cost  and  na 
tional  ruin,  leaving  the  dissensions  which  will 
grow  out  of  a  division  of  spoils  to  settlement 
and  conditions  which  the  time  may  afford. 

I  do  not  stand  here  as  the  partisan  of  any 
man.  Knowing  General  Fremont  as  I  do,  I 
love  him.  I  know  him  to  be  deliberately  brave, 
and  unconditionally  patriotic,  with  a  will  to 
act,  and  a  nerve  for  that  will ;  a  mind  to  com 
prehend,  a  judgment  to  direct,  and  an  ability 
to  execute  ;  pure  and  honest,  with  a  soul  which 
rises  above  the  groveling  walks  of  the  wily  poli 
tician,  the  jealous  professor  of  conditional  pa 
triotism,  the  serpentine  course  of  the  oppressors 
of  men,  and  of  those  Treasury  vampires  who 
fasten  alike  upon  individuals  and  nations, 
drawing  their  lite-blood,  for  selfish  aggrandize 
ment.  He  does  not  anticipate  their  base 
machinations,  nor  prepare  to  meet  them  ;  and 
when  he  finds  himself  basely  and  cowardly 
stabbed,  assassinated  by  those  who  had  pro 
fessed  their  friendship,  he  pities  the  soulless 
wretches  who  could  inflict  the  wound,  and  looks 
to  time  and  justice  for  his  vindication. 

Yet,  sir,  though  I  loved  and  devotedly  served 
tinder  him  during  his  command  in  the  Western 
department,  I  did  not  return  with  him  from 
Springfield  after  his  relief.  Col.  Lovejoy  of 
Illinois,  Col.  Hudson  of  Indiana,  and  myself, 
all  members  of  his  staff,  chose,  and  with  his 
full  approbation  remained  with  the  army,  to 
which  he  and  we  were  attached  by  ties  stronger 
than  life,  and  severed  only  when  the  army  was, 
under  Gen.  Hunter,  ordered  to  return  where 
our  further  association  could  do  no  good  to 
either. 

I  mention  this  to  show  that,  though  cherish 
ing  every  hope  and  prospect  for  General  Fre 
mont's  just  success,  I  bind  my  fate  and  will  to 
no  man,  only  so  far  as  his  pathway  lies  along 
those  lines  of  justice  which  Deity  draws  direct 
ly  from  Him  to  the  hearts  of  all  men ;  but  here, 


as  elsewhere,  I  shall  enjoy  and  exercise  that 
freedom  of  thought  and  action  which  is  the 
leading  trait  in  the  character  of  him  for  whom 
I  speak. 

I  speak  here  as  a  member  of  this  House,  fully 
recognising  the  duties  of  that  trust,  and  only 
desirous  that  justice  be  done  between  the  coun 
try  I  serve,  and  one  of  her  most  worthy  citi 
zens. 

I  am  not  here  to  ask  favors  of  this  House  for 
General  Fremont.  Such  act  would  be  alike 
unjust  to  him  and  the  country.  As  an  honest 
man  he  could  take  neither  more  or  less  than,  by 
fixed  principles  of  justice  between  him  and 
his  country,  are  his  dues ;  and  the  Government 
well  administered  will  only  give  to  one  of  her 
citizens  that  which  under  like  circumstances 
she  bestows  upon  another.  And,  though  this 
be  true,  General  Fremont  has,  and  from  the 
hour  of  his  appointment  as  Major  General  had, 
legally,  the  highest  military  rank  in  the  army 
of  the  United  States,  except  the  President 
and  Lieutenant  General  Wiufield  Scott ;  yet 
his  devotion  to  his  country,  his  love  of  order  in 
our  councils,  his  modesty  of  self  defence,  and 
willing  submission  to  the  directing  power, 
choosing  to  lose  place,  power,  property,  and 
life  if  necessary,  rather  than  distract  our  forces 
by  jealousies  and  contentions  in  this  hour  of  our 
nation's  trials,  has  made  him  never  so  much  as 
demand  his  rank  and  place.  What  I  say  on 
this  subject  I  say  on  my  own  responsibility,  but 
fully  knowing  what  1  say.  Over  this  question  of 
rank  even  the  President  has  no  power,  and  the 
position  which  General  McClellan  has  held  in  the 
army  is  an  error  over  General  Fremont's  legal 
rights.  He  whose  energy  and  wisdom  has  pro 
vided  armies,  gun-boats,  mortar-boats,  and  writ 
ten  basis  for  the  plans  of  the  present  triumph 
ant  Western  campaign,  is  discarded  by  the  in 
fluence  of  the  combination  against  him,  and 
slandered  by  the  political  scavengers  of  the 
country. 

Major  Generals  Fremont  and  McCleVan  were 
appointed  the  same  day  ;  hence,  their  commis 
sions  bear  the  same  date.  This  would  leave 
them  of  equal  rank.  In  such  cases  the  military 
law  directs  that,  to  determine  the  superior  rank 
of  one,  you  ascertain  the  relative  rank  of  the  ap 
pointees  prior  to  promotion.  This  done,  we 
find  that  McClellan  was  a  captain  and  Fremont 
a  lieutenant  colonel — two  grades  higher  than 
McClellan.  Such  is  the  state  of  this  case.  I 
feel  confident  that  when  the  President  has 
known  his  duty  in  these  premises,  he  will  dis 
charge  it  under  the  law. 

I  ask  for  Fremont;  JUSTICE — stern  and  unvar 
nished.  No  more,  no  less.  I  know  nothing  person 
ally  of  any  contracts  made  by  the  officers  of  this 
Government  for  arms  or  supplies  to  be  used  in 
the  prosecution  of  this  war.  Nor  have  my  peo 
ple  engaged  in  such  contracts.  I  do  not  now 
know  that  any  man  in  my  district  has  a  contract 
with  any  branch  of  the  War  Department,  or 
their  agents,  for  furnishing  arms  or  supplies. 


My  people  are  in  the  service  of,  but  not  in  the 
speculations  against  the  Government.  They 
and  I  stand  free,  clear,  and  unincumbered.  And 
for  them,  for  justice,  and  myself,  I  stand  to 
defend  him  against  the  injustice  done  by  par 
ties  in  interest. 

I  have  no  disposition  to  assail  the  committee. 
It  is  not  my  purpose  or  my  duty.  The  mem 
bers  of  the  committee  are,  with  myself,  mem 
bers  of  this  House,  and  are  my  peers  on  this 
floor.  I  aided  in  raising  this  committee,  and 
unlike  some  of  my  friends  over  the  way,  who 
make  common  cause  against  another  com 
mittee  for  special  objections,  I  would  vote  again 
for  investigating  any  department  of  the  Gov 
ernment  which  does  not  stand  above  suspicion. 

If  public  papers  are  being  plundered  from  the 
White  House,  investigate  it.  When  campaign 
maps  were  furnished,  in  July  last,  by  traitors 
in  the  War  Department  to  the  enemy,  causing 
defeat  of  our  army  at  Bull  Run  and  Manassas, 
it  should  have  been  investigated.  When  Adju 
tant  General  Thomas  treasonably  published 
the  strength  of  our  army  in  Kentucky  and  in 
Missouri  while  in  the  field,  giving  to  the  enemy 
the  locality,  destination,  and  numbers  of  our 
forces,  he  should  have  been  tried  for  treason, 
condemned  and  shot  by  the  men  whom  he  be 
trayed,  as  a  warning  to  traitors  everywhere. 
Sir,  my  present  complaint  against  the  com 
mittee  is,  that  they  have  not  fully  investigated 
the  subjects  before  them.  They  should  have 
examined  both  sides  of  all  cases  prior  to  a 
report.  The  accused  should  have  been  present. 
Gen.  Fremont  had  no  notice  of  the  time,  place, 
or  purpose  of  the  committee's  sitting.  The 
examination  was  made  when  he  was  in  the 
field,  at  the  head  of  his  army,  hundreds  of 
miles  from  St.  Louis  where  its  sessions  were 
held;  and  that  the  House  may  more  fully  un 
derstand  the  net-work  of  oppression  which  has 
been  so  dexterously  and  perseveringly  thrown 
around  him  by  parties  in  influence  and  power, 
by  directing,  neglecting,  permitting,  or  re 
straining  him,  controlling  his  acts,  or  counter 
manding  his  orders  in  his  presence  or  his  ab 
sence  as  seemed  to  his  pursuers  most  con 
ducive  to  his  injury,  I  will  briefly  explain  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  testimony  in  this 
report  relating  to  him  was  taken.  That  portion  of 
it  taken  in  New  York  was  without  notice  to  him 
and  while  he  was  at  St.  Louis,  managing  the  vast 
department  under  his  command.  And  I  do  not 
now  intend  saying  of  that  taken  at  St.  Louis, 
that  it  was  with  a  purposed  intention  to  wrong 
anyone  ;  but  that  either  the  committee  or  Fre 
mont  was  purposely  victimized,  is  apparent  to 
any  one  who  knows  the  facts  and  cares  to 
reflect  upon  them. 

On  the  10th  day  of  July  last,  this  committee 
was  appointed  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
a  resolution  offered  by  Mr.  VAN  WYCK,  now 
chairman  of  the  committee.  This  was  sixteen 
days  before  General  Fremont  took  command 
of  the  department  of  the  West. 


It  was  expressly  understood  from  the  re 
marks  of  the  chairman  of  the  committee,  made 
on  the  introduction  of  the  resolution,  that  pec 
ulations  were  going  on  in  the  War  Department 
at  Washington,  and  this  House  having  raised 
the  committee,  would  very  naturally  expect 
that  it  should,  in  a  reasonable  time,  be 
investigated  and  reported,  particularly  so 
since  Secretary  Cameron  was  in  his  depart 
ment  almost  the  entire  time  since  the  com 
mittee  was  appointed,  up  to  the  date  of  his 
resignation;  and  as  a  member  of  this  body, 
and  one  who  favors  investigation,  let  me  now 
say  here,  in  my  place,  that  I  do  hope,  if  the 
committee  intend  to  make  an  investigation  of 
the  contracts  entered  into  by  the  War  Depart 
ment  while  under  the  charge  of  Secretary 
Cameron,  that  he  shall  have  notice  of  the  time, 
place,  and  purpose  of  the  committee's  sitting; 
that  at  least  his  presence  may  be  his  privilege. 
Then,  if  he  fails  to  show  his  innocence,  the 
country  will  apply  the  censure  ;  and  as  he  is 
appointed  to  a  ibreign  mission,  let  the  investi 
gation  be  had  before  he  leaves  the  country,  and 
not,  as  was  done  in  General  Fremont's  case, 
when  he  was  in  command  of  his  army  in  the 
field,  far  from  the  committee  and  from  public 
conveyance,  and  even  then  without  notice. 

But  the  House  must  know  that  this  is  only 
one  of  several  committees  connected  with  this 
case. 

Immediately  after  General  Fremont's  procla 
mation  was  published,  an  inquisitorial  com 
mittee  started  from  the  Federal  capital  to  St. 
Louis,  consisting  of  Quartermaster  General 
Meigs  and  Postmaster  General  Blair.  A  sin 
gular  committee  to  examine  a  military  depart 
ment  !  And  concurrent  with  their  starting  from 
Washington,  notices  were  inserted  in  leading 
journals  of  the  country  informing  the  public 
that  this  committee  had  gone  to  the  West  to  in 
vestigate  General  Fremont's  department ;  crea 
ting  the  impression  that  some  great  wrong  had 
been  done  there,  requiring  two  such  person 
ages,  one  of  them  a  Cabinet  officer,  to  examine. 

And  fol'owing  closely  the  return  of  the  in- 
quision  to  this  city,  the  public  journals  were 
filled  with  the  published  intention  of  removing 
General  Fremont  for  inefficiency.  This  charge 
was  new  to  the  people,  who  read  in  his  energy 
and  success  a  refutation  of  it.  It  was  new  to 
the  world,  a '-id  it  was  new  to  those  who  invented 
but,  like  all  other  "  new  and  useful  im 
provements,"  the  inventors  were  entitled  for  a 
limited  time  to  the  benefit  of  their  patent.  Let 
it  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  this  discovery 
was  not  made  until  the  proclamation  of  Au 
gust  30th  was  published.  Some  who  were  par 
ticularly  loud  in  their  praise  of  his  ability  prior 
to  that  publication,  were  now  the  first  to  assail 
him.  They  made  haste  to  correspond  with  po 
litical  friends  and  intimate  associates  here,  and 
were  soon  in  the  same  conspiracy,  clamoring 
for  the  fall  of  the  man  whom  but  a  few  days 
before  they  delighted  to  honor. 


8 


The  inevitable  conclusion  in  every  mind  is, 
that  the  inquisition  and  concurrent  publications 
to  which  I  have  referred,  were  but  the  prepara 
tory  steps  to  do  what  they  knew  to  be  a  grave 
wrong,  and  which  the  public  mind  would  not 
receive  until  trained  to  it  by  a  sue  session  of 
approaches,  made  upon  it  from  different  quar 
ters  and  influences,  which  the  sequel  to  this 
history  of  wrongs  will  show  to  have  been  most 
assiduously  applied. 

Culminating  in  the  "temporary"  relief  of 
Fremont  from  command — retiring  of  the  army 
from  Springfield,  followed  by  robbery  and  blood 
shed  over  two-thirds  of  the  State — the  corabi 
nation  and  conspiracy  against  him  was  gain 
ing  numbers  and  strength.  The  force  against 
him  had  assumed  form.  Slavery  was  its  centre 
column;  political  knavery  commanded  on  the 
right  wing  as  the  post  of  honor  in  this  most 
unholy  crusade,  and  on  the  left  were  semi-trai 
tors  in  office  and  influence,  disappointed  con 
tractors,  and  Treasury  plunderers. 

But  the  great  miscreant  in  this  struggle  of 
wrong  against  right  is  slavery ;  whose  advocates, 
plying  with  their  usual  activity  and  ingenuity, 
like  great  and  practiced  criminals  in  the  com 
mission  of  fraud,  securing  its  profits,  yet  avoid 
ing  that  justice  due  to  the  committers  of 
those  accursed  crimes  so  long  inflicted  upon 
our  country  ;  and  which  have  been  borne  with 
until  we  have  lost  that  manhood  which  God 
intended  all  men  should  have,  as  a  safeguard 
against  wrong  and  oppression. 

The  responsibility  on  the  people  of  this  coun 
try  at  this  time  is  a  fearful  one,  and  fearfully 
we  will  answer  it,  unless  freemen  stand  up  and 
demand  freemen's  rights. 

The  coming  Presidential  campaign  is  looked 
to  by  those  men  with  the  keen  perception  of  long- 
practiced  political  schemers.  A  transposition  of 
the  locality  of  President  and  Vice  President, 
will,  as  a  p61itical  necessity,  take  place.  As  the 
North  and  South  are  in  conflict,  the  East  and 
West  will  be  required  to  change  hands  upon 
this  question. 

Those  who  cannot  expect  from  this  and  other 
reasons  to  reach  the  higher,  will  hope  that  mere 
locality  may  possibly  give  them  the  lower  of 
those  positions.  And  knowing  that  the  public 
mind  will  be  incensed  at  the  accursed  cause  of 
slavery  which  has  produced  all  our  national 
calamities,  it  becomes  necessary  to  shape  that 
pablic  mind  so  as  to  receive  another  cheat  and 
treason  as  preliminary  to  its  still  further  use,  by 
men  devoid  of  that  lofty  devotion  to  country 
which  marks  the  real  good  man,  but  yet  who 
rejoice  in  their  unjust  successes  at  the  nation's 
expense  and  sacrifice  j  and  to  effectually  do 
this,  it  becomes  necessary  to  strike  down  the 
man  who  is  himself  the  consistent  and  acknowl 
edged  representative  of  that  great  truth  of  his 
proclamation,  which  finds  at  this  time,  regard 
less  of  party,  a  welcome  response  in  the  hearts 
of  the  Northern  people.  And  knowing  that 
they  abhor  dishonor  in  their  public  servants,  his 


persecutors  shrewdly  attempt  to  fasten  that 
charge  upon  Fremont  by  the  arts  of  practiced 
demagogues  and  energy  of  bad  men  in  a  bad 
cause,  with  the  success  which  follows  for  a 
time  the  efforts  of  combinations  against  the 
single-handed,  who,  attending  to  his  own  duty, 
does  not  anticipate  or  prepare  for  the  associated 
treason  of  dishonest  men. 

I  know  that  the  combination  is  a  strong  one, 
and  that  General  Fremont,  because  a  friend  of 
freedom,  is  the  sacrifice  to  be  offered  by  author 
ity  on  the  altar  of  his  country  as  a  peace-offer 
ing  to  the  slave  power.  It  is  but  the  first  step  of 
that  march  to  degradation  which  you  will  all 
soon  recognise ;  for  the  want  of  nerve  and  man 
hood  to  repel  the  aggressors  and  to  sustain  Fre 
mont  in  his  proclamation  will  come  upon  us 
from  this  same  combination,  which  is  one  lor 
power  and  place  ;  and  when  this  war  is  ended, 
with  rebel  slavery  protected  by  the  Government, 
those  slaveholding  traitors  will  turn  upon  you 
in  these  Halls,  denounce  your  brave  soldiers  as 
a  rabble,  and  rejoice  at  the  blood  they  have 
spilled.  Under  the  protection  of  the  flag  they 
have  desecrated  and  torn,  they  will  lash  their 
slaves  to  daily  toil — protected  by  the  laws  they 
have  violated  and  denounced,  they  will  scorn 
the  widows  and  orphans  their  treachery  has 
made,  and  again  will  they  strike  down  any 
representative  who  in  these  Halls  dares  to  point 
out  their  crime.  You  will  talk  of  the  high  mission 
and  glory  of  the  nation,  while  rebels  stand,  by 
your  permission — nay,  with  you  sanction  ;  ah ! 
with  still  more,  your  protection — with  one  hand 
on  the  throat  of  their  slaves  who  are  patriots, 
and  with  the  other  tears  the  flasr  which  is  the  em 
blem  of  our  national  honor.  You  see  this,  you 
know  it;  the  world  sees  it  and  condemns  it; 
all  civilized  men  pity  you,  and  scorn  the  im 
becility  which  permits  it.  You  endorse  the 
proclamations  of  generals  in  favor  of  protecting 
slavery.  At  this  moment  we  are  asked  to  en 
dorse  and  make  a  law  of  the  late  jubilant 
repetition  of  General  Halleck's  Order  No.  3. 
You  send  your  sons  to  fight  this  war,  brought 
on  by  slaveholders,  for  the  purpose  of  per 
manently  establishing  slavery  on  the  ruins  of 
our  Government.  Slaves  aid  their  rebel  mas 
ters  in  every  species  of  the  labor  of  war,  and 
procuring  supplies  for  their  armies.  You  listen 
to,  and  endorse  the  proclamations  of  those  gen 
erals  who  avow  that  this  relation  of  master  and 
servant,  even  of  rebels,  shall  not  be  molested; 
protecting,  by  this  means,  the  very  forces  you 
are  warring,  and  holding  the  enemies'  weapons 
at  the  heart  of  our  friends. 

Not  only  so,  but  the  slaves  themselves  are 
loyal,  and  would  be  true  to  our  flag  and  peo 
ple.  To  endorse  slavery  is  a  mark  reckless 
enough  in  this  age  of  civilization  ;  but  for  free 
men  to  aid  in  holding  those  persons  in  bondage 
to  the  traitors  of  the  country,  men  whom  we 
despise  and  loathe,  is  a  degree  of  ingratitude 
which  the  negro  himself  will  pity  in  us,  and 
feel  proud  that  he  is  a  slave.  It  is  not  enough 


that  the  nation  has  lost  over  twenty  thousand 
of  her  brave  sons  by  death  in  hospital  and  bat 
tle-field  ;  that  Rachel  is  weeping  for  her  chil 
dren,  and  will  not  be  comforted,  because  they 
are  not ;  that  the  blood  of  those  four  hundred 
and  eighty  brave  young  men  stained  the  ensan 
guined  field  of  Manassas ;  that  the  disgrace  of 
that  struggle  has  severely  rebuked  our  wonted 
prestige  in  war ;  that  we  have  spent  in  this 
causeless  rebellion  over  $600,000,000,  and  with 
the  inevitable  necessity  before  us  of  spending 
hundreds  of  millions  more  ;  that  the  Ball's  Bluff 
murder  is  but  a  part  of  this  accursed  tragedy, 
where  treason  and  treasonable  blunders  mur 
dered  by  the  hands  of  slavery's  maddening  de 
mons  a  brave  and  loved  officer  and  a  thousand 
pure  patriots  ;  that  at  Springfield,  Lyon  and 
his  men  struggled  against  a  fearful  and  hellish 
power,  until,  outnumbered,  he  and  hundreds  of 
his  soldiers  lay  dowu,  for  the  last  time,  and 
their  dead  and  mangled  bodies  become  prison 
ers  to  traitors,  who  could  not  conquer  them 
while  living.  It  is  not  enough  that  at  Rich 
Mountain,  Coruifex  Ferry,  Belmont,  Freder- 
ickton,  Lexington,  Springfield,  Roauoke,  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  our  brave  brethren  fell 
mardered  by  traitors,  for  slavery;  but  these 
same  traitors  are  to  be  protected  and  apologized 
for  here,  and  tke  man  who  dared  to  proclaim 
their  property  confiscated  to  the  public  use,  and 
their  slaves  freemen,  is  hunted  down  through 
every  avenue  which  human  ingenuity  can  in 
vent,  prompted  by  the  most  remorseless  desire 
to  fasten  on  us  and  continue  this  cause  and  or 
igin  of  all  our  woes.  Of  history  we  learn  noth 
ing  ;  our  own  we  do  not  study.  We  blindly  sit 
here  while  the  vortex' is  opening  again  to  re 
ceive  us.  The  blood  of  our  people,  the  tears  of 
our  widows  and  orphans,  the  sword  of  the  army, 
and  the  Congress  of  the  nation,  all  fail  to  do  a 
simple  act  which  God  has  warned  us,  through 
lamentations  and  sorrow,  is  our  duty  to  man 
kind  and  to  Him.  But  in  face  of  all  this,  we 
support  those  who,  with  vulture  eye,  have 
huuted  the  friend  of  freedom  to  his  fall,  and 
have  divided  his  garments. 

The  charge  of  inefficiency  was  too  shallow  a 
pretext  to  deceive  any  one,  more  especially  the 
Western  people,  who  bore  witness  to  his  trials 
and  his  efforts,  as  well  as  the  results  of  his 
labors  in  his  extensive  department,  "which 
was  the  State  of  Illinois  and  the  States  and 
Territories  west  of  the  Mississippi  river  and  on 
this  side  the  Rocky  Mountains,  including  New 
Mexico,"  and  subsequently  including  a  part  of 
Kentucky  and  the  river. 

He  took  command  of  the  Western  Depart 
ment  wholly,  without  special  instructions,  with 
full  discretionary  power  to  conduct  himself 
under  the  arduous  duties  of  that  position  as  his 
judgment  should  dictate.  He  entered  upon  his 
duties  at  St.  Louis  on  the  25th  day  of  July, 
1861,  and  found  the  department  in  the  most 
deplorable  condition,  almost  without  arms  and 
military  stores,  wholly  without  money,  clothing, 


or  provisions.  From  the  6th  of  June  previous 
Missouri  had  been  in  the  command  of  General 
McClellan,  and  from  the  perplexed  and  needy 
condition  of  the  Government,  had  been  wholly 
but  unavoidably  neglected.  Lyon's  troops  had 
not  been  paid  or  clothed  by  the  Government 
during  the  time  he  commanded  them.  General 
Lyon  was  in  the  south  west  part  of  Missouri,  need 
ing  reinforcements.  There  was  trouble  in  the 
northwest,  requiring  more  troops  than  we  had 
there.  In  the  northeast  part  of  the  State  we 
had  barely  enough  troops  to  meet  the  ene 
my;  while  in  the  southeast,  Bird's  Point,  Capo 
Girardeau,  Ironton,  Rolla  and  St.  Louis,  with 
Cairo,  Illinois,  were  threatened  by  a  large  force 
of  the  enemy,  and  no  adequate  preparations 
made  to  meet  the  emergency.  The  railroads 
were  continually  threatened  and  frequently  de 
stroyed — the  incendiary's  torch  performing  its 
office;  arms  were  taken  from  Union  men  by 
squads  of  rebels  all  over  the  State;  treason 
walked  on  the  highways  and  denounced  the  flag 
and  Government  with  impunity.  The  State 
was  wild  wit^excitement,  persons  flocking  to 
the  rebel  sta,uWd  from  the  very  doors  of  the 
Government  twicers — St.  Louis  itself  seething 
with  treason  and  rebelion. 

"  The  State  government  in  inextricable  con 
fusion  unable  to  lend  a  helping  hand  ;  no  arias, 
no  equipments,  no  horses  for  cavalry,  no  large 
guns  for  batteries,  or  small  guns  for  field  artil 
lery  ;  all  the  affairs  of  the  Department  in  help;ess 
contusion ;  no  system,  .no  money,  no  officers, 
and  no  credit ;"  the  Department  entirely  neg 
lected  by  those  whose  duty  it  was  to  provide 
for  it. 

The  whole  country  was  in  commotion.  The 
failures  of  our  army  of  the  Potomac  at  Bull's 
Run  and  Manassas  ;  its  retreat  on  Washington  ; 
the  surrender  of  Harpers'  Ferry  with  our  arse 
nal  and  arms,  the  machinery  of  which  for  man 
ufacture  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands  ;  the  retir 
ing  of  Patterson  from  the  Virginia  shore — had 
all  gone  to  embolden  the  rebels,  who  were  then 
much  better  armed  than  were  our  forces.  The 
authorities  at  Washington,  trembling  at  the. ad 
vance  of  a  victorious  enemy,  who  were  within 
sight  of  the  Capitol,  were  using  every  effort  to 
make  "  Washington  safe,"  having  but  one  man 
ufactory  for  arms  left,  and  but  few  arms  in  the 
arsenals  or  market,  the  major  part  of  them 
having  been  plundered  by  Floyd  and  hia  trai 
torous  coadjutors,  left  the  Western  Department 
almost  destitute. 

All  the  arms  which  could  be  procured  by  the 
Government  were  sent  to  the  army  of  the  Po 
tomac.  Its  money  was  spent  there ;  its  clothing 
was  forwarded  and  used  there  ;  the  demand  was 
great  and  the  supplies  small.  In  vain  did  Gen 
eral  Lyon,  days  and  weeks  before  Fremont's 
arrival,  plead  for  money  to  pay  his  needy  troops, 
and  with  which  to  provide  commissary  and 
quartermaster's  stores.  In  vain  did  he  ask  them 
to  pay  the  debts  he  had  contracted.  In  vain 
did  he  call  for  arms  and  reinforcements.  In 


10 


vain  did  he  notify  the  Government  that  his  troops 
had  neither  pay  nor  clothing  from  the  Gov 
ernment  during  their  three  months'  service — 
that  their  families  were  in  want,  they  dispirited 
from  the  neglect  and  unwilling  to  re-enlist  on 
account  of  it.  In  vain  did  Fremont  plead  for 
arms.  In  vain  did  he  ask  for  money  and  mili 
tary  stores ;  compelled  to  contract  loans  on  his 
own  responsibility  to  pay  troops  and  furnish 
troops  and  arms.  In  vain  did  he  inform  the 
Government  that  his  troops  were  mutinous  and 
those  whose  times  were  expiring  unwilling  to 
re-enlist  on  account  of  the  failure  to  pay.  He 
importuned  until  a  Cabinet  officer  wrote  to  him 
that  he  could  get  no  attention  to  the  West  or 
Western  matters ;  that  he  must  take  every  need 
ful  responsibility  to  save  the  people  over  whom 
he  was  specially  set. 

Such  are  the  ordeals  through  which  Lyon 
and  Fremont  passed,  and  paved  the  way  to 
others'  honor  and  renown. 

When  General  Fremont  took  command  of 
the  Western  department,  there  were  less  than 
twenty-five  thousand  troops  in  th^entire  com 
mand  5  of  which  forces  ten  thousfy  i  were  three 
months'  .men,  all  of  whose  time's&tpired  within 
ten  days  after  his  arrival,  leaving  him  some  fif 
teen  thousand  in  all  that  vast  department.  Of 
the  whole  forces,  Lyon  had  near  one  third  at 
Springfield;  the  remainder  were  with  Pope  in 
North  Missouri  ;  Prentiss,  Cairo  5  Lawler,  Bird's 
Point ;  Bland,  Pilot  Knob  ;  Wyman,  at  Rolla ; 
Shrifel,  Lexington;  Stephenson,  at  Booneville; 
Smith  and  Marsh,  at  Cape  Girardeau;  and 
Burnstine,  at  Jefferson  City;  with  a  remnant 
at  St.  Louis ;  all  the  Missouri  troops  poorly 
clothed,  not  paid,  some  of  them  badly  armed, 
and  dispirited;  whilst,  as  I  have  said,  the  ene 
my,  buoyant  with  hope,  had  over  sixty  thou 
sand  .  men  in  the  field,  and  their  forces  fast 
augmenting. 

Pillow,  in  southeast  Missouri,  17,000 ;  Har- 
dee,  near  Greenville,  7,000;  Price,  southwest, 
threatening  Lyon,  with  near  30,000  ;  Harris,  in 
northeast,  with  1,600;  Green,  in  northwest, 
with  over  1,500 ;  Thompson  and  Watkins,  near 
Girardeau,  5,000;  making  a  total  of  62,100. 

The  enemy  had  cavalry  and  large  amounts 
of  artillery  ;  while  the  Federal  forces.were  with 
out  cavalry  and  but  little  artillery ;  the  whole 
State  in  revolt,  and  the  young  men  joining  the 
enemy.  General  Fremont,  fully  anticipating 
the-  wants  of  his  vast  department,  and  well 
knowing  the  needs  of  the  Government,  with  its 
disposition  to  call  arms,  ammunition,  and  sup 
plies  to  Washington,  on  receiving  information, 
while  in  this  city,  from  Governor  Yates  of  Illi 
nois,  that  he  had  seven  thousand  men  ready 
to  march,  only  that  they  were  without  arms, 
called  on  General  Ripley,  of  the  Ordnance 
Department,  and  obtained  a  promise  that,  out 
of  twenty-five  thousand  stands  of  arms  then  on 
hand,  seven  thousand  stands  should  be  imme 
diately  forwarded  to  the  West  for  those  troops. 
On  the  next  day,  Ripley  informed  General  Fre 


mont,  at  New  York,  that  the  Governor  of  Illi 
nois  must  be  mistaken  in  wanting  arms,  and 
that  they  could  not  be  had.  Of  this  he  notified 
the  President  through  the  Postmaster  General, 
who  informed  him  that  the  President  would  in 
person  attend  to  this  matter;  which  he  did  by 
the  appointment  of  Major  Hagner  to  assist 
General  Fremont  in  procuring  arms  by  pur 
chase  for  the  West.  And,  notwithstanding  this 
precaution  and  kindness  by  the  President,  the 
arms  and  supplies  purchased  for  the  West  were 
sent  by  Hagner  to  Washington  for  the  army  of 
the  Potomac  as  appears  "in  the  committee's 
report  of  Hagner's  testimony.  Not  over  about 
2,000  stands  of  arms  came  from  Hagner  to 
Fremont. 

Another  ruse  played  on  Fremont  was  to" 
send  an  order,  dated  July  24,  1861,  for  five 
thousand  stands  of  arms  on  the  arsenal  at  St. 
Louis,  when  there  were  none  there  to  fill  the 
order. 

Large  amounts  of  those  that  were  there  in 
the  spring  of  1861  were  rifled  and  repaired, 
under  the  supervision  of  this  same  Major 
Hagner,  who  then  had  charge  of  the  arsenal, 
and  delivered  to  General  Buckner,  which  have 
been  used  against  our  troops  in  Kentucky, 
until  captured  by  the  forces  under  Generals 
Grant,  Wallace,  McClernand,  and  Smith,  and 
Commodore  Foote,  which  is  a  part  of  the  army 
raised  by  General  Fremont.  On  his  arrival 
in  the  West,  the  Government  was  almost  des 
titute  of  supplies,  being  compelled  to  send  her 
agents  into  the  open  market  to  purchase  for 
the  Potomac  army.  Different  Governors  also 
had  their  agents  in  the  market,  purchasing 
supplies  for  their  respective  States ;  all  of  which 
were  competing  with  each  other,  raising  the 
prices  at  times  to  much  more,  and  seldom  at 
as  little  as  the  real  peace  price  of  the  arms 
and  munitions  of  war.  To  show  the  House  the 
very  high  prices  which  arms  and  ammunition 
reach  in  times  of  war,  in  Governments  where 
as  in  this  country,  ample  national  factories 
have  not  been  constructed  and  in  use,  I  will 
read  from  a  treatise  on  the  rise  in  prices  in 
arms  and  ammunition  in  England  during  the 
Crimean  war : 

"  When  a  sudden  demand  arose  for  an  enormous  supply 
of  the  munitions  of  w;ir,  not  only  were  private  establish 
ments  unable  to  provide  them  iu  sufficient  quantities,  but 
those  that  were  supplied  were  produced  at  a  cost  consid 
erably  beyond,  and  in  some  cases  of  four  and  live  times 
their  value,  and  of  a  quality  so  inferior  as  to  involve  great 
risk  of  the  failure  of  military  operations. 

'•'The  shells  for  which  the  contractors  during  the  late 
(Russian)  war  charged  $324  per  tbn,  are  now  produced  in 
the  Government  factories  for  $66  per  tori." 

It  was  during  such  a  struggle  for  arms  that 
General  Fremont  was  compelled  to  enter  the 
market  without  money  to  compete  with  the 
United  States  and  the  several  States  in  the  pur 
chase  of  arms  for  his  needy  department,  of 
supplies  for  his  gun-boats  and  his  mortar-boats, 
and  to  equip  his  land  and  river  forces  with 
a  concentration  of  which  to  quell  a  gigantic 
rebellion  in  the  vast  country  included  in  his 


11 


command.  Hs  could  not  advertise,  for  he  had 
no  money  to  pay  for  what  was  required.  He 
could  only  get  what  people  were  willing  to  let 
him  have  upon  credit.  And  it  is  worth  while 
naming,  in  this  connection,  that  the  Govern 
ment  is  at  this  moment  refusing  to  pay  for  the 
supplies  thus  furnished. 

At  this  moment,  and  ever  since  the  removal 
of  General  Fremont,  an  illegal  committee,  pre 
sided  over  by  the  man  most  instrumental  in  the 
procuring  of  General  Fremont's  removal,  and 
violently  opposed  to  him  politically,  has  been 
sitting  in  inquisition  upon  his  administration 
at  St.  Louis — annulling  contracts.  I  repeat, 
annulling  contracts.  The  Essex,  which,  since 
before  the  battle  of  Belmont,  has  been  active 
in  protecting  Kentucky,  and  bore  a  distin 
guished  part  in  the  victories  which  have  glad 
dened  and  revived  the  loyal  part  of  the  na 
tion — that  very  Essex,  costing  much  less  than 
half  the  price  of  the  gun-boats  built  by  Govern 
ment — delivered  to  the  Government  completely 
finished  and  furnished,  not  only  with  every  ar 
ticle  of  necessity,  but  even  of  comfort,  including 
the  cabin  furniture  of  the  officers  and  crew — 
put  on  board  and  paid  for  by  the  private  means 
of  the  officer  employed  to  build  her,  (Captain 
Adams;)  even  for  this  they  have  refused  to 
pay,  but  struck  off  two-thirds  from  the  fair  and 
reasonable  cost,  and  that  upon  the  full  and  de 
tailed  exhibition  of  the  most  satisfactory  vouch 
ers.  And  this,  because  this  boat  was  built  under 
the  orders  of  General  Fremont.  Compelled  to 
strike  a  bargain  wherever  he  could,  he  offered — 
single-handed — the  credit  of  the  Government, 
and  plead  his  pressing  necessity  as  an  excuse 
for  the  offer;  and  though  thus  burthened  with 
duties  which  belong  to  the  Government,  and 
which  for  all  her  other  generals  except  Lyon 
she  has  performed,  he  procured  his  arms  and 
supplies,equipped  and  managed  his  army,  throw 
ing  his  forces  along  those  vast  distances,  quiet 
ing  and  controlling  the  rebellion,  repairing  rail 
roads  and  building  bridges,  and  discharging  all 
the  duties  of  officers  of  armies  organized,  and 
which  do  not  move,  in  addition  to  those  services 
of  which  I  have  spoken.  And  yet  we  are  told  he 
is  inefficient.  By  whom.?  Why,  sir,  by  that 
cabal  which  has  pursued  him  because  of  his  proc 
lamation,  in  which  are  the  friends  of  that  insti 
tution  of  slavery  here  held  above  the  peace  of 
families,  the  desolation  of  societies  and  States, 
the  sacrifice  of  property,  and  the  lives  of  free 
men;  a  cause  whose  advocates  find  no  sorrow 
or  shame  in  marshalling  its  hosts  for  strife  and 
blood  against  the  Government,  its  law,  peace, 
and  citizens. 

General  Fremont  is  always  successful  when 
pursuing  the  dictates  of  his  own  judgment, 
which  early,  pointed  out  the  necessity  of  having 
gun-boats  and  mortar-boats  to  use  on  the  rivers 
iu  connection  with  his  land  forces.  He  had 
such  constructed,  the  first  under  the  supervision 
of  the  brave  and  competent  Commodore  Foote, 
who  commanded  them  with  honor  to  himself 


and  the  country;  the  mortar-boats  by  that  most 
excellent  officer  and  gentleman,  Mr.  Adams.  I 
clip  the  following  just  remarks  from  the  New 
York  Times  relative  to  these  boats  : 

"Speaking  of  the  success  of  Footo  and  Porter,-, does  it 
occur  to  you  to  look  back  :iud  give  credit  whero  credit  is 
due,  to  the  man  who  planned  the  enterprises  which  have 
yielded  such  abundant  returns?  Do  you  recollect  that 
among  the  first  charges  that  were  brought  against  Fremont 
was  the  one  that  lie  was  wasting  money  in  building  gun 
boats  to  be  used  on  the  Western  rivers,  and  that  an  unend 
ing  Hood  of  ridicule  and  abuse  was  heaped  upon  what  was 
called  '  his  visionary  scheme  ? '  Fremont  has  not  been  per 
mitted  to  reap  the  full  harvest  of  the  seed  he  planted  ;  but 
the  future  will  know  that  1'or  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  and 
probably  for  the  ultimate  reduction  of  Columbus  and  the 
clearing  out  of  the  Mississippi,  the  nation  will  be  indebted 
to  General  Fremont's  foresight  and  adaptation  of  means  to 
an  end.  The  campaign  of  the  West  is  coming  back  to  the 
lines  upon  which  Fremont  stood  when  his  triumphant  career 
was  cut  short.  Thus  time  and  circumstances  are  vindicating 
him,  almost  before  the  ink  is  dry  upon  the  paper  that  doomed 
him  to  inaction,  and  for  a  time  to  public  censure." 

After  General  Fremont  had  well  secured  his 
outposts,  and  fortified  them,  with  the  fortifica 
tions  of  St.  Louis  in  an  advanced  state,  he  moved 
his  forces  to  the  towns  of  California,  Tipton,  Sy 
racuse,  Sedalia,  and  Georgetown,  his  headquar 
ters  to  Jefferson  city,  thence  to'  Tiptoo,  intend 
ing  to  move  in  pursuit  of  the  army  under  Price, 
in  seven  divisions,  under  Generals  Sigel,  As- 
both,  McKinstry,  Pope,  Hunter,  Sturgis,  and 
Lane  ;  in  all  near  forty  thousand  men. 

On  the  1 1th  of  October,  Secretary  Cameron 
and  Adjutant- General  Thomas  reached  St. 
Louis,  as  I  learn  from  their  published  journal  of 
events,  so  injudiciously  given  by  Thomas  to  the 
country,  and  after  examining  the  fortifications 
there,  reached  Tipton,  where  I  saw  the  Secretary, 
on  Sunday  the  13th  of  the  same  month,  review 
ing  a  portion  of  the  troops  there  and  in  Syra 
cuse,  leaving  the  same  day,  and  on  the  14th 
ordered  the  work  on  the  fortifications  at  St. 
Louis  to  be  stopped.  This  was  done  without  no 
tice  to  Fremont.  And  at  the  time  Messrs.  Came 
ron  and  Thomas  were  in  his  camp,  they  were 
the  bearers  of  an  order  to  relieve  him  of  com 
mand,  dated  October  7th,  six  days  prior  to 
their  visit.  Yet  they  did  not  serve  the  order 
or  inform  the  General  that  such  was  in  being. 
This  order  was  left  in  St.  Louis,  in  the  hands 
of  inferior  officers,  and  General  Fremont  per 
mitted  to  march  South  with  his  forces  in  pur 
suit  of  Price,  which  he  did  with  the  full 
knowledge  of  Secretary  Cameron  and  Adjutant 
Thomas,  on  the  morning  of  the  llth.  On  the 
morning  of  the  IGih,  two  days  after  Fremont 
left  the  railroad  at  Tiptou,  the  VAN  WYCK  com 
mittee  commenced  its  investigations  at  St. 
Louis.  And  the  order  for  the  relief  of  Gene 
ral  Fremont  from  command  was  changed  from 
the  7th  to  the  24th  of  October,  as  will  appear 
by  reference  to  the  instrument  itself.  The 
committee  closed  their  testimony  on  the  29  h. 
five  days' after  the  alteration  of  the  date  of  th^ 
order — which,  thus  mutilated  by  irresponsible 
hands,  was  served  on  him  at  Springfield,  No 
vember  2d,  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles  from 
where  Secretary  Cameron  left  him.  The  order 
to  relieve  General  Fremont  was  signed  by  Gen- 


12 


eral  Scott,  and  beforer  it  was  served  on  him, 
which  was  26  days  after  its  first,  and  9  days  af 
ter  its  last  date,  General  Scott  had  retired  from 
service,  and  General  McClellan  was  Comman 
der-in-chief;  and  so  strangely  was  this  business 
transacted,  that  General  McClellan  on  the  2d 
of  November,  the  same  day  that  General  Fre 
mont  was  relieved  at  Springfield,  Missouri, 
issued  an  order  at  Washington,  directing  him 
what  course  to  pursue  with  his  army.  This  was 
duly  received  on  the  4th,  by  General  Fremont, 
two  days  after  its  date,  on  his  way  to  St.  Louis, 
in  obedience  to  the  prior  order. 

This  is  the  most  singular  conduct  ever  em 
anating  from  any  department  of  any  Govern 
ment.  Let  us  review  it.  An  order  to  relieve  the 
Major  General  commanding  the  Western  de 
partment  is  issued  and  signed  by  the  Com- 
inander-in-chief,  October  Y  ;  is  carried  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  his  Adjutant  General  to 
the  camp  of  the  commanding  general,  six  days 
after  its  date,  and  knowing  that  he  is  intending 
to  move  with  an  army  of  forty  thousand  men, 
in  pursuit  of  an  enemy  in  the  field,  with  all 
the  equipments  for  war,  do  not  serve  the  order 
or  prevent  the  movement  of  the  army.  After 
he  has  gone  from  the  last  point  of  prompt  com 
munication,  they  stop  the  work  on  the  fortifica 
tions  ordered  by  him  prior  to  starting.  Two 
days  after  this  an  investigating  committee,  which 
was  appointed  by  Congress  sixteen  days  before 
Major  General  Fremont  entered  on  his  duties 
(and,  notwithstanding  this  committee  was  ap 
pointed  at  the  instance  of  the  chairman  to  ex 
amine  the  Secretary's  conduct,  then  chal 
lenged  by  him  as  imprudent  and  unjust,)  com 
mence  an  investigation  of  this  new  department, 
without  notice  to  the  General  of  its  purpose, 

fathering  its  information  from  his  avowed 
nown  and  personal  enemies — the  date  of 
the  order  to  relieve  changed  by  irresponsible 
inferior  officers  to  the  24th  of  same  month. 
The  committee  closed  their  investigation  on  the 
29th,  five  days  after  this  change  of  date.  The 
order  is  not  served  until  the  2d  of  November, 
nine  days  after  its  last  date,  and  four  days 
after  the  committee  close  their  testimony, 
when  an  order  from  McClellan  reached  Warsaw, 
Missouri,  in  two  days.  The  trip  can  be  readily 
made  from  St.  Louis  to  Springfield  in  three  days, 
being  160  miles  by  railroad  and  130  by  good 
wagon  road.  The  investigating  committee  com 
menced  its  labors  two  days  after  he  started  from 
the  railroad,  and  left  before  he  returned.  And 
the  Commander-in-chief  did  not  know  that  a 
Major  General  was  relieved  twenty -six  days 
after  the  order  issued. 

Whether  this  singular  coincidence  was,  by 
the  committee,  recognised  at  the  time,  I  do 
not  know  ;  but  that  no  man's  good  name  should 
be  assailed  in  his  absence,  without  notice,  has 
been  settled  as  good  law. 

And  that  a  commander-in-chief  should  learn 
in  less  than  twenty-six  days  that  an  order  to 
relieye  a  Major  General,  who  was  commanding 


an  extensive  department,  with  over  sixty  thou 
sand  troops,  had  issued,  will  hardly  need  affir 
mation  here. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  whilst  he  pur 
sued  Price  with  a  heavy  force,  his  occupation 
of  Kentucky,  at  Paducah,  Cairo,  Illinois,  with 
almost  the  entire  State  of  Missouri,  was  fully 
established  and  maintained.  His  removal  at 
the  time  he  had  succeeded  in  concentrating 
his  forces  at  Springfield,  for  his  certain  and 
swift  descent  on  Price's  army,  was  fatal,  not 
only  to  him,  but  to  the  State  of  Missouri  and 
the  country.  With  an  army  in  high  spirits,  well 
disciplined,  with  some  seven  thousand  cavalry, 
eighty-six  pieces  of  artillery,  and  the  remainder 
infantry,  abundant  trains,  with  provisions, 
such  as  could  not  be  procured  in  the  country, 
had  it  not  been  for  two  occurrences,  which 
are  worthy  of  notice  here,  General  Fremont 
would  have  engaged  Price  before  the  order  for 
his  relief  reached  him.  One  was  the  swollen 
condition  of  the  Osage  river,  over  which  he 
threw  a  trussel  bridge  800  feet  in  length  through 
a  deep  and  rapid  current  in  thirty-six  working 
hours — getting  the  material  from  the  forest — on 
which  his  army  passed  with  all  his  artillery  and 
stores,  and  returned  again  under  General 
Hunter.  The  second  hindrance  was  the  tardy 
movements  of  Generals  Pope  and  Hunter. 

The  country  has  been  informed,  by  the  pub 
lication  of  Adjutant  General  Thomas's  diary 
of  his  peregrinations  through  Missouri  and 
Kentucky,  among  other  and  singular  things, 
that  for  want  of  means  of  transportation 
General  Fremont's  army  could  not  move  at  all, 
which  at  the  date  of  his  report  had  moved  sixty 
miles  from  where  he  saw  it,  and  built  a  bridge 
over  a  navigable  river,  and  moving  on  ;  and, 
secondly,  that  Generals  Hunter  and  Pope 
could  not  do  so  for  the  same  reason.  To  dis 
abuse  the  public  mind.  I  will  insert  the  state 
ment  of  Col.  I.  C.  Woods,  chief  of  transporta 
tion,  made  to  the  General,  under  date  of  Octo 
ber  18,  at  Warsaw,  showing  the  amount  and 
character  of  transportation  of  each  division  of 
the  army,  except  Generals  Sturgis  and  Lane's. 
The  report  shows  the  number  of  teams,  whether 
Government,  hired,  or  pressed,  of  each  division, 
at  that  date  : 

Government.    Hired. 

Gen.  Hunter 205 

Gen.  Pope 90 

Gen.  Sigel 102  25      Enough  pressed  to  move , 

Gen.  Asboth....l65  15          80  " 

Geu.  HcKinstry.  SO 

Col.  Marshall...  10  12  " 

Maj.  Holman  ...     3 

Maj.  Zagonyi..  ..  12  2  "     for  band. 

Headquarters...  16  3  " 

633  40          97 

Yet  Pope  reached  Springfield  only  on  the 
2d  of  November,  and  Hunter  late  in  the  eve 
ning  of  the  3d,  and  his  command  on  the  4th, 
where  Fremont  and  the  other  divisions  had 
been  for  over  a  week.  And  though  the  roads 
were  good,  their  teams  did  not  arrive  with  tents, 
cooking  utensils,  and  provisions,  for  some 


13 


time  afterwards,  puting  their  men  to  severe  and 
unnecessary  exposure,  which  I  saw  with  sorrow, 
and  of  which  I  have  a  right  and  a  will  to  speak 
of  here.  A  portion  of  my  constituents  were 
in  those  commands.  The  neglect  was  unneces 
sary,  and  I  am  now  as  I  was  then,  and  there 
stated,  firmly  convinced  that  it  was  done  to 
create  distrust  in  the  minds  of  the  troops  against 
General  Fremont ;  and  that  they  had  teams  is 
further  evidenced  by  their  subsequent  arrival. 
The  advance  divisions  saved  their  men  by 
hauling  their  knapsacks,  leaving  them  their 
arms  and  ammunition  to  carry — the  roads  were 
good.  The  world  may  determine  whether  it 
was  a  part  of  the  combination,  when  they  know 
who  took  command. 

While  General  Fremont  was  at  Springfield, 
Price  with  a  much  heavier  force  was  at  Cass- 
ville,  and  at  intermediate  points  between  those 
places — his  advance  at  one  time  reaching  to 
Wilson's  Creek  battle  ground,  ten  miles  from 
Springfield  ;  his  heaviest  forces  being  at  Cass- 
ville,  and  McCullough  at  Flat  Creek,  nearer 
our  forces.  That  the  armies  would  soon  have 
met  and  fought  is  beyond  any  doubt,  unless 
Price  had  again  fled  ;  and  in  that  case  every 
preparation  was  made  for  a  most  vigorous 
pursuit,  with  ample  amounts  of  stores  for 
the  severest  campaign.  It  has  been  said  that 
Price  was  not  in  force  and  threatening  a 
battle.  I  shall  be  willing  to  believe  what  such 
officers  as  Sigel,  Asboth,  Albert,  and  nu 
merous  scouts,  loyal  citizens  of  Missouri,  as 
well  as  officers  from  our  cainp  sent  to  Price's 
for  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  believed  to  be 
true.  I  conversed  with  them  at  the  time. 
In  this  belief,  I  particularly  rely  on  the  state 
ments  of  General  Franz  Sigel,  'whose  reputa 
tion  as  a  military  commander  is  established 
both  in  Europe  and  America,  who  had  com 
mand  of  the  advance,  and  who  used  in  my 
presence  to  Colonels  Hudson  and  Lovejoy,  the 
following  words :  "  I  know  that  we  will  fight 
Price  in  forty-eight  hours ;"  and  but  for  the 
arrival  of  Hunter  and  Pope,  and  removal  of 
Fremont,  it  would  have  taken  place.  The  arrival 
of  two  divisions  of  an  army  was  to  Price  tan 
gible,  and  his  information  certain,  that  Fre 
mont's  forces  had  reached  him;  but  that  General 
Fremont  would  be  removed  at  that  time,  and 
under  the  circumstances  surrounding  him  and 
his  army,  no  man  of  Price's  good  sense  would 
believe,  even  if  he  had  heard  it.  That  Hunter 
V  believed  the  advance  of  the  enemy  to  be  near 
\  I  am  well  convinced  from  the  caution  he  ex- 

\     ercised  in  making  a  reconnoissance  in  force  to 

\    the  old  battle  ground,  in  which  I  accompanied 

\  him.  And,  again,  only  eight  days  after  General 

\  Hunter's   order  to  retire  with  his  forces  north 

\of  the  Osage  river,  Price  followed  him,  and 

/captured  part  of  his  train,  and  for  thirty-six 

consecutive  days  ravaged  all  the  country  south 

4  of  the  Osage,  and  much  of  that  lying  north  of 
it.  At  the  town  of  Warsaw,  where  General 
Fremont  crossed  the  Osage  river,  and  General 


Hunter  returned  on  the  bridge  of  which  I  have 
spoken,  if  we  are  to  believe  the  newspapers,  our 
own  officers  burned  a  portion  of  our  quartermas 
ter  and  com  missary  stores,  to  prevent  their  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  so  closely  were  they 
pursued  more  than  one  hundred  miles  north  of 
Springfield.  We  all  rejoiced  over  victories  made 
by  General  Davis,  with  part  of  Pope's  division, 
more  than  one  hundred  miles  north  of  where 
Fremont  had  carried  peace  and  quiet.  Sir, 
the  voice  of  citizens  plundered,  and  the  blood 
of  loyal  men  murdered  in  all  that  country  by 
the  enemy,  after  General  Fremont's  removal, 
will  riae  up  against  those  who  were  engaged  in 
procuring  it. 

To-day  we  are  again  rejoicing  over  victories 
of  our  brave  troops  at  Springfield,  and  on  the 
exact  lines  of  march  which  Fremont  made  and 
intended  to  make.  These  gun-boats  and  mortar- 
boats  scour  the  rivers,  carrying  all  before  them  ; 
the  forces  organized  by  him  now  in  Kentucky 
under  the  brave  Generals  Smith,  Grant,  Wal 
lace,  and  McClernand  5  and  the  forces  under 
General  Bueli  are  marching  on  the  identical 
roads,  and  taking  the  same  towns,  which  Gen 
eral  Fremont  advised  the  President,  by  the 
following  letter  of  September  8,  should  be  se 
cured  : 

[Private.] 

WESTERN  DEPARTMENT. 


September  8,  1861. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  I  send  by  another  hand  what  I  ask  you  to 
consider  in  respect  to  the  subject  of  the  note  by  your  spe 
cial  messenger. 

In  this  I  desire  to  ask  your  attention  to  the  position  of 
ailau-s  in  Kentucky.  As  the  rebel  troops,  driven  out  from 
Missouri,  had  invaded  Kentucky  in  considerable  force,  and 
by  occupying  Union  City,  Hickman,  and  Columbus,  were 
preparing  to  'seize  Paducah  and  attack  Cairo,  I  judged  it 
impossible,  without  losing  important  advantages,  to  defer 
any  longer  a  forward  movement.  For  this  purpose  I  have 
drawn  from  the  Missouri  side  a  part  of  the  force  which  had 
been  stationed  at  Bird's  Point,  Cairo,  and  Cape  GirarJeau, 
to  Fort  Holt  and  Paducah;  of  which  places  we  have  taken 
possession.  As  |h,«  rebel  forces  outnumber  ours,  and  the 
counties  of  KentuX^ky  between  the  Mississippi  and  Tennes 
see  rivers,  as  well  a?  those  along  the  latter  aad  the  Cumber 
land,  are  stongly  secessionist,  it  becomes  imperatively  ne 
cessary  to  have  the  co-operation  of  the  loyal  Union  forces 
under  Generals  Anderson  and  Nelson,  as  well  as  of  those 
already  encamped  opposite  Louisville,  under  Colonel  Rous 
seau.  I  have  reinforced,  yesterday,  Padncah  with  two  reg 
iments,  and  will  continue  to  strengthen  the  position  with 
men  and  artillery.  As  soon  as  General  Smith,  who  com 
mands  there,  is  reinforced  [sufficiently  to  enable  him  to 
spread  his  forces,  he  will  have  to  take  and  hold  Mayfield 
and  Lovelaceville,  to  be  in  the  rear  and  flank  of  Columbus, 
and  to  occupy  Smithland,  controlling  in  this  way  th«  mouths 
of  both  the  Tennessee  and  the  Cumberland  rivers.  At  the 
same  time  Colonel  Rousseau  should  bring  his  force,  in 
creased,  if  possible,  by  two  Ohio  regiments,  in  boats  to  Hen 
derson,  and  taking  the  Henderson  and  Nashville  railroad, 
occupy  Ilopkinsville,  whilo  General  Nelson  should  go  with 
a  force  of  5,000,  by  railroad,  to  Louisville,  and  from  there 
to  Bowling  Green.  As  the  population  in  all  the  counties 
through  which  the  above  railroads  pass  are  loyal,  this  move 
ment  could  be  made  without  delay  or  molestation  to  the 
troops.  Meanwhile,  General  Grant  would  take  possession  of 
the  entire  Cairo  and  Fulton  railroads,  Piketon,  New  Mad 
rid,  and  the  shore  of  the  Mississippi  opposite  Hickman  and 
Columbus.  The  foregoing  disposition  having  been  effected, 
a  combined  attack  will  be  made  upon  Columbus,  and  if  suc 
cessful  in  that,  upon  Hickman,  while  Rousseau  and  Nelson 
will  move  in  concert,  by  railroad,  to  Nashville,  Tennessee. 
occupying  the  State  capital,  and,  with  an  adequate  force, 
New  Providence.  The  conclusion  of  this  movement  would 
he  a  combined  advance  toward  Memphis,  on  the  Mississippi, 
as  well  as  the  Memphis  and  Ohio  railroad,  and  I  trust  the 
result  would  be  a  glorious  one  to  the  country. 


In  reply  to  a  letter  from  Gen.  Sherman  by  the  hand  of 
Judsje  Williams,  ia  relation  to  the  v  st  importance  ot  tse- 
c-iring  possession  in  adv'ince  of  the  c  >uutry  lying  between 
the  Ohio,  Tennessee,  and  Mississippi,  I  have  to-day  suggest 
ed  the  first  part  of  the  precediog  plan.  By  extend  lit;  my 
command  to  Indiana,  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  you  would 
eunble  me  to  att.mptthe  accomplishment  of  this  all-iin- 
pjrt ;nt  result ;  and  in  order  to  secure  the  secrecy  nee  s- 
nary  to  its  success,  I  sha'l  not  extend  the  commun'CAtion 
which  1  have  made  to  Gen.  Sherman,  or  repeat  it  to  any 
one  else. 

With  high  respect  and  regard, 

1  am,  very  truly,  yours, 

J.'C.  FKEMONT. 

This  was  before  the  enemy  had  occupied  them, 
and  they  could  have  been  seized  without  blood. 
Nashville  would  have  been  in  our  possession  by 
the  first  of  October,  and  the  Union  citizens  of 
Tennessee  have  been  saved  from  the  hellish  mur 
ders  inflicted  on  them.  The  blood  of  the  mur 
dered  of  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri, 
in  battle,  in  the  secret  places  of  the  mountains, 
in  the  prairies  and  forests,  fields,  and  highways, 
will,  like  Abel's,  cry  to  God  from  the  ground 
for  this  double  murder.  The  enemies  of  free 
dom  in  the  South  rose  against  her  friends 
there,  and  the  enemies  of  freedom  here  rose  up 
against  their  deliverer  and  destroyed  him,  cut 
ting  off,  for  a  long  time,  all  aid,  while  the  cav 
erns  of  the  mountains  echo  back  the  dying 
shrieks  of  murdered  loyal  citizens ;  and  still  the 
combination  in  full  conspiracy  coldly  calculates 
upon  the  flexibility  of  the  American  mind, 
hoping  still  to  mould  it  for  their  further  use. 
Fremont  was  removed  because  the  slave  power 
demanded  it. 

FORTIFICATIONS,  ST.  LOUIS. 

The  question  of  the  necessity  for  the  fortifi 
cation  of  any  point  is  a  military  one,  to  be  de 
termined  by  the  officer  in  command,  at  the  time 
and  place,  in  view  of  the  surroundings  ;  and 
whether  St.  Louis  should  have  been  fortified 
was  properly  the  province  of  General  Fre 
mont  to  decide  ;  in  fact,  the  committed  do 
not  of  their  judgment  attempt  to  pass  upon 
it,  but  introduce  General  Curtice  as  a  witness 
of  different  opinion.  I  must  confess  that  it 
was  with  some  surprise  I  read  in  the  report 
that  General  Curtice  thought  the  fortifica 
tions  unnecessary.  I  perfectly  recollect  that 
in  conversation  with  him  at  his  house  at 
the  barracks,  where  he  was  in  command,  on 
the  day  prior  to  General  Fremont's  starting  to 
Jefferson  City  and  Tipton,  en  route  for  Spring 
field  and  Price,  he  said  to  me,  that  the 
troops  then  at  the  barracks  were  raw,  some 
of  them  unarmed,  could  not  defend  the  city 
against  the  attack  of  an  ordinary  force,  and 
that  the  barracks  should  have  been  built 
in  the  State  of  Illinois,  putting  the  Mississippi 
river  between  them  and  the  enemy.  It  does 
seem  to  me  that  fortifications  were  as  necessary 
as  this  precaution,  particularly  as  troops  are  to 
defend  against,  and  not  to  be  defended  by  the 
enemy.  St.  Louis  is  a  large  city ;  it  was  to 
Fremont  what  Washington  is  to  McClellan — 
his  base  of  operation  ;  that  while  the  Potomac 
river,  a  mile  in  width,  forms  a  protection  to 


this  city,  running  as  it  does  between  it  and 
the  enemy's  advance,  preventing  the  egress 
and  ingress  of  spies,  St  Louis  is  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river,  with  its  approaches  all 
exposed,  and  the  river  a  barrier  against  rein 
forcements  from  the  loyal  States,  as  certainly 
as  the  Missouri  river  was  to  General  Sturges, 
who  was  unable  to  ai4  Mulligan,  though  only  the 
river  between  them,  and  the  remainder  of  Gen 
eral  Stone's  command  when  Baker  feil.  Yet 
not  only  General  Scott  and  General  McClellan 
thought  it  necessary  to  fortify  Washington,  but 
this  Congress  at  its  special  session,  and  thia 
one,  have  voted  directly  for  that  purpose  many 
hundred  thousands  of  dollars.  Is  property  in 
Washington,  the  lives  of  her  people,  or  the 
cause  of  justice,  or  duty  of  her  military  officer 
to  maintain  it,  more  sacred  or  more  binding 
than  in  St.  Louis  ? 

The  committee  affirm  that  the  soldiers  should 
have  built  those  fortifications.  These  were  in 
all  a  heavy  work.  It  was  warm  weather ;  the 
climate,  as  has  been  clearly  proven,  not  conge 
nial  to  the  Northern  soldier  until  acclimated.  But 
the  strongest  reason  was  that  the  troops  at  St. 
Louis  were  received  raw  and  generally  unarmed. 
They  were  necessarily  equipped  and  drilled  as 
soon  as  possible  and  thrown  to  the  outposts. 
This  was  the  continued  and  necessary  practice 
at  that  point.  No  body  of  troops  were  retained  af 
ter  being  fully  armed  and  equipped;  and, indeed, 
necessity  sent  many  to  outposts  not  well  armed 
and  drilled.  The  Governors  of  States  who  came 
up  so  nobly  to  the  cause  requested  in  all  cases 
that  their  troops  be  not  thrown  into  active  ser 
vice  without  drill.  Fremont's  was  not  a  besieg 
ing  or  a  besieged  army.  He  was  in  command 
only  100  days,  in  which  time  he  raised  his  forces 
from  15,000  to  62,000,  arming,  equipping,  feed 
ing,  and  clothing  them,  attended  with  the  diffi 
culties  which  I  have  already  named,  moving 
them  to  and  fortifying  points  distant  from  St. 
Louis  as  follows :  Cape  Girardeau,  120  miles ; 
Ironton,  80  5  Bird's  Point,  200  ;  Jefferson  City, 
125;  Rolla,  120;  and  Cairo,  111.,  200,  and  Pa- 
ducah,  Kentucky,  230;  besides  moving  forces 
over  and  quieting  all  North  and  West  Missouri, 
watching  and  repairing  railroads  through,  and 
holding  military  occupation  of,  almost  the  entire 
State,  moving  near  40,000  men  290  miles  by 
way  of  Tipton  to  Springfield,  guarding  the  en 
tire  country,  driving  a  victorious  army  before 
him,  and  giving  peace  and  quiet  to  the 
people  except  in  the  south  border,  and  would 
in  a  few  days  have  cleared  the  State  of  enemies, 
had  he  not  been  removed.  If  he  had  simply 
been  stationed  with  an  immense  force  to  guard 
the  city  of  St.  Louis,  as  has  been  the  case  at 
this  city,  he  could  have  fortified  it  as  he  did 
his  outposts  with  his  soldiers,  and,  too,  without 
the  aid  of  Congress. 

Again:  General  Fremont  found  the  commerce 
and  labor  of  the  city  paralyzed ;  and  much  want 
and  suffering ;  a  large  number  of  the  laboring 
people  of  St.  Louia  thrown  out  of  employ,  dia- 


15 


satisfied  with  the  Government,  because  taught 
by  those  wealthy  and  traitorous  scoundrels  who 
had  furnished  them  labor,  but  now  did  not, 
that  the  Government  was  the  cause  of  the  war 
and  their  suffering.  The  labor  on  the  barracks 
and  fortifications  furnished  employ  for  several 
thousand  hands  at  good  wages,  and  by 
this  expenditure  the  minds  of  many  men 
were  disabused,  and  St.  Louis  now  presents 
the  spectacle  of  poor  patriots  and  wealthy  trai 
tors — the  entire  foreign  population  loyal.  The 
feud  between  the  German  and  Irish  element 
when  Fremont  reached  St.  Louis  was  of  a 
character  approaching  an  outbreak.  By  the  ex 
penditure  of  this  mone£  the  city  was  quieted. 
The  fortifications  were  so  built  as  to  command 
both  the  city  and  the  approaches  to  it,  including 
the  river  above  and  below  it.  The  city  is 
wealthy,  and  if  it  should  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy  would  furnish  supplies  to  their 
entire  army.  Theirs  is  a  war  of  robbery  ; 
ours  of  protection.  A^ain  :  General  Fremont 
needed  all  his  forces,  his  purpose  being,  so  soon 
as  quiet  was  restored  in  the  Southwest  part  of 
the  State  by  the  destruction  of  Price's  army, 
which  in  a  few  days  he  would  have  effected, 
without  returning  with  his  army  to  St.  Louis, 
to  have  met  his  combined  forces  at  the  river, 
and  with  a  concerted  movement  of  his  Ken 
tucky  troops,  with  his  gun-boats  and  mortar- 
boats  and  Missouri  forces,  to  move  down  the 
river,  leaving  St.  Louis  in  charge  of  troops 
enough  to  man  her  fortifications,  it  being  his 
grand  depot,  the  centre  of  travel  and  trade  of 
the  West,  approached  by  seven  railroads,  three 
in  Illinois  and  four  in  Missouri,  as  well  as 
river  line  between  those  States,  opening  to  his 
gun-boats  and  mortar-boats  the  Missouri,  Ohio, 
Tennessee,  Cumberland,  and  lower  Mississippi 
rivers.  Connected  as  it  is  by  telegraph  with  the 
free  States  and  the  Capital,  he  could  keep  up 
his  lines  of  communication  for  all  purposes 
with  the  granaries  of  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio, 
and  Iowa.  The  great  free  Northwest  could 
pour  her  troops  into  his  army  in  any  need. 

Sir,  the  life,  the  spirit,  the  labor,  the  plan, 
and  the  success  of  this  great  Western  campaign, 
is  General  John  C.  Fremont's.  History  and  the 
honest  judgment  of  mankind  will  give  it  to  him, 
and  he  will  yet  have  the  reward  of  his  labor, 
combinations  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 

As  a  question  of  economy,  the  fortifica 
tion  of  St.  Louis  was  entirely  tenable.  That 
city  has  a  population  of  160,000;  her  best 
fighting  loyal  element  was  already  in  our  lines, 
away  from  their  homes.  They  knew  the  dan 
ger,  because  compelled  to  quell  rebellion  at 
their  own  door-steps.  With  their  homes  for 
tified,  those  troops  felt  that  the  Government 
was  in  earnest,  and  cared  for  them ;  a  feeling 
not  so  prevalent  with  many  three  months'  men 
if  we  may  believe  General  Lyon,  who  said  they 
were  dispirited  and  felt  they  were  neglected. 
Confidence  is  all  and  all  to  fighting  men. 
There  is  no  man  who  loves  his  country  but  who 


loves  his  family;  and  he  who  knows  that  his 
family  is  in  danger  of  these  murderous  slave- 
drivers,  whose  course  so  far  is  one  of  robbery 
and  slaughter,  treads  with  unsteady  step  the 
path  which  leads  from  home  ;  but  when  he  feels 
himself  in  danger  for  the  safety  of  those  ob 
jects  of  his  hope  and  affection,  he  counts  no 
odds,  and  proudly  meets  his  foes. 

But  to  hold  a  city  of  the  size  of  St.  Louis 
without  fortification,  against  forces  which  could 
in  the  rear  of  an  advancing  army  rise  and 
seize  its  stores,  or  burn  the  city,  it  would  re 
quire  fully  tea  thousand  well  armed  troops, 
with  costs  not  varying  materially  from  the  iol- 
lowing : 
10,000  men  at  wages  43  cents  per  day $4,300 

u        "     at  expense  25  i(      u      "    2,500 

500  horses,  for  teams  and  artillery,  20  cents  per  day      125 

7,925 

In  addition,  it  will  require  100  wagons  and 
harness  for  horses,  v/rith  wear  and ,  tear  in  all, 
equaling  $8,000  per  day. 

The  fortifications  will  require  less  than  half 
that  number  of  men,  wagons,  horses,  and  arms. 

So  that  the. expense  of  $4,000  per  day,  with 
a  loss  of  5,000  men,  50  wagons,  250  horses,  and 
artillery  for  field  service,  with  arms  for  all,  can 
be  saved  by  the  fortifications,  which  would  be 
a  saving,  in  fifty  days,  of  their  entire  cost  at 
the  price  they  were  built,  not  counting  the 
service  in  the  field  of  the  spare  forces.  Now 
when  quiet  is  restored  it  is  said  they  were  not 
needed.  It  is  easy  to  say  that  a  successful  pre 
caution  was  not  necessary. 

But  what  made  St  Louis  safe  ?  Was  it  those 
committees  which  have  followed  General  Fre 
mont  so  perseveringly  at  such  respectful  dis 
tances  ?  Was  it,  the  policy  which  has  suffered 
the  Potomac  blockaded,  both  above  and  below 
the  Capital — the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad 
and  canal  destroyed — three  out  of  four  of  the 
approaches  to  the  city  of  Washington  cut  off — 
which  surrenders  the  Harper's  Ferry  manufac 
tory  of  arms  and  arsenal,  with  machinery,  to  the 
enemy — an  army  murdered  at  Ball's  Bluff,  in 
sight  of  their  brave  and  anxious  friends,  with 
out  means  of  relief— the  Capital  with  200,000 
men  beleaguered  for  six  months — was  it  these  ? 
No !  no !  It  was  a  brave  and  active  army,  im 
bued  with  the  same  spirit  of  freedom  which 
moved  him  who  organized  it. 

But  in  addition  to  the  deprivations  against 
which  Lyon  and  Fremont  had  to  contend,  of 
which  I  have  spoken,  troops  and  arms  were 
called  from  that  endangered  and  needy  depart- 
partment,  at  times,  too,  when  they  were  most 
required ;  compelling  General  Lyon,  at  one 
time,  to  the  unwelcome  necessity  of  refusing  to 
obey  the  orders  of  the  Government,  and  with 
holding  troops  from  superior  demand.  And  as 
testimony  to  prove  what  I  have  said,  I  intro 
duce  and  incorporate  in  my  remarks  letters  and 
telegrams,  and  extracts  of  each  from  the  cor 
respondence  of  Generals  Lyon  and  Fremont ; 
and  for  the  further  purpose  of  dispelling  the 


16 


unjust  aspersions,  so  industriously  circulated 
against  Fremont,  charging  him  with  a  neglect 
oi  duty  to  General  Lyon  in  not  reinforcing  him 
prior  to  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek,  showing 
by  the  telegrams  of  General  McClelland  and 
the  President  their  opinions  of  the  importance 
of  holding  Cairo  and  Northeast  Missouri,  and 
the  necessity  of  saving  this  region,  which  lay 
in  proximity  to  the  river  and  State  of  Kentucky, 
which  would,  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  di 
rectly  endanger  the  city  of  St.  Louis  and  entire 
State  of  Missouri. 

These  telegrams  and  official  writings  will 
show  the  following  state  of  facts  : 

That  General  Fremont  took  charge  of  his 
command  July  25,  1861. 

That  it  was  imperatively  necessary  to  rein 
force  Cairo. 

That  the  enemy's  forces  far  exceeded  any 
possible  numbers  Framontcoald  bring  to  bear. 

That  your  troops  were  not  fed,  paid,  or 
clothed,  by  the  Government,  while  Lyon  was  in 
command. 

That  General  Lyon  made  urgent  requests 
for  them. 

That  drafts  were  made  on  him  for  troops  un 
til  he  finally  refused  to  obey  the  order. 

That  General  Fremont  reinforced  Cairo  on 
the  2d  of  August,  which  was  as  soon  as  possi 
ble. 

That  the  department  was  destitute  of  money 
or  supplies. 

That  Government  would  not  pay  attention  to 
his  urgent  requests  more  than  it  did  Lyon's. 

That  General  Fremont  ordered  troops  to 
General  Lyon,  August  3d,  seven  days  prior  to 
the  fight  at  Wilson's  Creek,  which  was  Au 
gust  10. 

That  General  Lyon  notified  Fremont  that,  in 
case  of  failure  to  reinfor.ce  him,  he  would  re 
tire. 

That  a  failure  to  reinforce  Cairo  would  have 
lost  the  State,  with  St.  Louis,  and  not  have  saved 
Lyon,  because  he  would  have  been  surrounded. 

That  there  was  not  armed  troops  enough  to 
reinforce  both. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  OHIO, 

Cincinnati,  June  18. 

Have  received  order  p'acing  Missouri  under  my  com 
mand.  Will  leave  for  St.  Louis  to-morrow.  If  more  troops 
are  needed  telegraph  me  details  of  case. 

G.  B.  McCLELLAN,  Major  Gen. 
CHESTER  HARDING,  jr.,  Ass't  Adj't  General. 

BOONEVILLE.  Mo.,  July  2, 1861. 

DEAR  COLONEL:  I  hope  to  move  to  morrow,  and  think  it 
more  important  just  now  to  go  to  Springfield.  My  force 
in  moving  from  here  will  be  about  2,400  mon.  Major 
Stnrgis  will  have  about  2,200  men,  and  you  know  what 
force  has  gone  to  Springfield  from  St.  Louis,  BO  that  you 
eee  what  an  amount  of  provisions  we  shall  want  supplied 
at  thet  point ;  please  attend  to  us  as  effectually  as  possible. 
Our  line  snould  be  kept  open  by  all  means.  I  must  be 
governed  by  circumstances  at  Springfield.  You  will  of 
course  have  due  attention  to  tho  Southeast.  The  State 
Journal  is  outrageous  and  must  be  stopped;  you  will  take 
such  measures  as  you  think  best  to  effect  this.  Our  cau«e 
is  suffering  from  too  much  indulgenco,  aud  you  must  so  ad 
vise  our  friends  in  St.  Louis.  Col.  Stevenson  must  have 
pretty  strong  garrisons  at  the  points  he  occupies  on  the 
river,  and  he  must  have  support  from  other  States  as  occa 
sion  Beeaos  to  require.  Col.  Curtis  is,  I  suppose,  on  the 


Hannibal  and  St.  Joseph  road ;  rigorous  measures  should 
be  shown  the  disorderly  in  that  region.  Our  operations 
are  becoming  extensive,  and  our  staff  officers  must  keep  up 
with  our  emergencies.  We  need  here  a  regular  Quarter 
master  aud  Commissary.  Cannot  something  bo  done  for 
us  from  Washington?  Yours  truly, 

N.  LYON,  Commanding. 

Col.  HARDING,  St.  Louis  Arsenal. 

P.  S.  I  c,inuoD  spare  more  than  300  stand  of  arms  for 
Home  Guarls  at  Jrffersm.  I  sha'l  not  be  abl"  to  supply 
other  portions  of  the  /State  with  the  same  proportion. 

N.  L. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OHIO, 

Buckharinan,  July  5,  1861. 

Communicate  freely  with  Pr-  utiss.  If  he  does  not  need 
Wyman  jrou  can  take  him.  Telegraph  to  G  n.lVp?,  at  Al 
ton,  to  give  you  a  regiment,  and  to  HurJbut,  at  Quiacy,  to 
give  you  another. 

Do  not  lose  sight  of  importance  of  Cairo,  and  of  its  opera 
tions  iu  Southeastern  Missouri.  Write  to  my  fully. 

G.  B.  McCLELLAN,  Major  Gen.  U.  S.  A. 
To  CHESTER  HARDING,  Asd-t.  Adj.  Gen. 

HEADQUARTERS  SOUTHWEST  EXPEDITION, 
Springfield,  Mo.,  July  la,  1861. 

SIR:  I  arrived  at  this  place  early  this  evening,  two  or 
three  hours  in  advance,  of  my  troops,  who  are  encamped  a 
f'W  miles  back.  I  have  about  5,000  men  to  beprovidtd 
for,  and  have  expected  to  find  stores  here,  as  I  have  ord«  red. 
The  failure  of  stor  ss  reaching  here  seems  likely  to  cause 
serious  embarrassment,  which  must  bj  aggravated  by  CCH- 
tmu'jd  delay,  and  in  proport:on  to  the  time  I  am  f  irctd  t  j 
wait  for  supplies.  *****  j  SQau  en_ 
d<  avor  to  take  every  due  precaution  to  meet  existing  <  mer 
gences,  and  hop"  to  be  able  to  sustain  the  cause  or  the 
Government  in  this  part  of  the  State.  But  there  must  he 
no  loss  of  tini';  ia  1'iriushiug  me  the  resources  I  have,  herein 
mentioned.  I  have  lost  in  rea"hing  this  place  about  four 
days  time,  by  the  high  wa'ers  in  Grand  and  Osaie  rivers, 
which  made  it  nec3esarj  to  lerry  them.  The  same  diffi 
culty  prevented  Sturgis  from  co-operating  with  Sigel  in 
time  to  afford  any  a'd.  Please  telegraph  to  McC  ellan  acd 
to  Washington  anything  in  this  letter  you  deem  of  impo'-t- 
ance  to  these  Headquarters.  Shoes,  shirts,  Mouses,  &c.,  ara 
much  wanted,  und  I  would  have  you  furnish  them,  if  possi 
ble,  in  considerable  quantities.  Yours  truly, 

N.  LYON,  B  -ig.  Ge  i.  Commanding. 

Col.  CHESTER  HARDING,  St.  Lou.s  Arsenal. 

ST.  Louis  ARSENAL,  July  15, 1861, 
By  telegraph  from  Chicago,  Jn'y  15,  1861. 
Have  dispatched  condition  of  aff  tirs  t>  Gen.  Fremont, 
and  asked  authority  to  take  the  field  in  N.  Missouri  with 
five  more  regiments.    Expect  answer  to-night.     Will  go 
down  and  confer  with  you  as  soon  as  I  hear.  "How  did  you 
succeed  with  Harris  1 

JOHN  POPE,  Brigadier  General. 
To  CHESTER  HARDING,  Jr. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  WFST, 

Springfield,  (Mo..)  July  15, 1861. 

COLONEL  :  Gen.  Lyon  is  now  here  with  about  7,000  men  ; 
of  these  fully  one-half  are  three  months'  volunteers,  whose 
term  of  service  has  nearly  expired — the  latest  expiring  on 
the  14th  of  August.  Gov.  Jackson  is  concentrating  his 
forces  in  the  southwestern  part  of  the  State,  and  is  receiving 
large  reinforcements  from  Arkansas,  Tennessee,  Louisiana, 
and  Texas.  His  effective  force  will  soon  be  certainly  not 
less  than  30,000  men — probably  much  larger.  All  idea  of 
any  further  advance  movement,  or  of  even  maintaining  our 
present  position,  must  soon  be  abandoned,  unless  the  Gov 
ernment  furnish  us  promptly  with  large  reinforcements  and 
supplies.  Our  troops  are  badiy  clothed,  poorly  fed,  and  im 
perfectly  supplied  with  tents ;  none  of  them  have  yet  been 
paid,  and  the  three  months'  volunteers  have  become  dis 
heartened  to  such  extent  that  very  few  of  them  are  willing 
to  renew  their  enlistment.  The  blank  pay  rolls  are  not 
here,  and  the  long  time  required  to  get  them  here,  fill  them 
up.  send  them  to  Washington,  have  the  payment  ordered, 
and  the  Paymaster  reach  us,  leaves  us  no  hope  that  our 
troops  can  be  paid  for  five  or  six  weeks  to  come.  Und<  r 
these  circumstances,  there  remains  no  other  course  but  fo 
urgently  press  upon  the  attention  of  the  Government  the 
absolute  necessity  of  sending  us  fresh  troops  at  once,  with 
ample  supplies  for  them  and  for  those  now  here.  At  least 
10,000  men  should  be  sent,  and  that  promptly.  You  will 
send  the  enclosed  despatch  by  telegraph  to  Gen.  McClellan, 
and  also  to  the  War  Department,  and  forward  by  mail  a 
copy  of  this  letter.  Lose  no  time  in  fitting  for  the  field  the 
three  years'  volunteers  now  at  the  Arsenal,  and  send  them 


17 


here  as  soon  as  possible.  Call  for  Col.  McNeil's  regiment  of 
Home  Guards  to  garrison  at  the  Arsenal,  and  allow  him  to 
organize,  if  for  the  regular  three  years'  service,  if  he  desires 
to  do  so.  It  is  believed  that  the  remaining  Home  Guards 
will  be  sufficient  for  the  city.  Should  it  be  necessary,  their 
term  of  service  can  be  renewed,  for  a  short  period,  for  the 
purpose  of  a  city  garrison.  The  General  is  not  aware  whe 
ther  Col.  Smith's  regiment  has  yet  taken  the  field  ;  if  not, 
he  presumes  that  both  his  and  Col.  Eland's  regiments  may 
be  sent  here  without  delay.  You  may  doubtless  leave  the 
care  of  the  southeast  part  of  the  t-tato  to  Gen.  Prentiss. 
Should  bt.  Louis  be  in  danger  from  that  direction,  troops 
could  easily  be  called  from  Illinois  and  Indiana  for  its  de 
fence;  moreover,  a  force  moving  on  St.  Louis  from  the 
South  would  be  exposed  to  attack  in  rear  from  Cairo. 
Hence  there  seems  little  or  no  danger  from  that  direction. 
Unless  we  are  speedily  reinforced  here,  we  will  soon  lose  all 
we  have  gained.  < nr  troops  have  made  long  marches,  done 
much  effective  service,  and  suffered  no  small  privations. 
They  have  received  no  pay  nor  clothing  from  the  Govern 
ment,  and  the  small  stock  furnished  by  private  contribu 
tion  is  now  exhausted;  so  that,  unless  the  Government 
gives  us  relief  speedily,  our  thus  far  successful  campaign 
will  prove  a  failure. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 
Captain  llth  Infantry,  Acting  Adjt.  General. 

To  Col.  CHE  TER  HARDING, 

Adjutant  General  of  Missouri  Volunteers, 

St.  Louis  Arsenal,  Missouri. 

P.  S.   Cannot  Col.  Curtis's  regiment  be  spared  from  St. 
Joseph,  and,  if  so,  send  it  forward. 

N.  LYON,  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  RIPLET  COUNTY  BATTALION, 

Camp  Burrows,  July  16, 1861. 

DEAR  SIR;  If  there  is  any  way  to  communicate  with  the 
Governor,  through  any  person  in  St.  Louis,  please  let  me 
know  it.  I  am  advancing  and  Gen.  Yell  will  follow  me  in 
a  few  days,  with  5,000  men.  He  will  take  position  betwem 
Rolla  and  Ironton,  and  act  as  circumstances  dictate. 
Gen.  Watkins  will  move  up,  sustained  by  Gen  Pillow,  and 
if  proper  energy  is  exercised  we  can  drive  the  enemy  north 
of  the  Missouri  and  into  St.  Louis  in  thirty  days.  You 
will  please  let  me  hear  from  you,  verbally  or  not,  through 
the  person  through  whom  this  passes;  and  please  senc 
The  Daily  Journal  for  a  short  time  to  Doniphan,  as  it  will 
toe  sent  to  me  by  my  couriers. 
Yours  respectfully, 

Col.  M.  JEFF  THOMPSON, 

Commanding  Ripley  Co.  Batt. 
JOSEPH  TUCKER,  Esq.,  Editor  The  State  Journal,  St.  Louis 

DEAR  Miss :  I  have  not  heard  from  you  yet,  bui 

make  free  to  trust  this  to  your  care. 

SPRINGFIELD,  Mo.,  July  17, 1861. 

SIR:  I  inclose  you  a  copy  of  a  letter  to  Col.  Townsenc 
on  the  subject  of  an  order  from  Gen.  Scott,  which  calls  for 
live  companies  of  the  2d  Infantry  to  be  withdrawn  from 
the  West  and  sent  to  Washington.  A  previous  order  with 
draws  the  mounted  troops,  aa  I  am  informed,  and  were  il 
not  that  some  of  them  were  en  route  to  this  place  they 
would  now  be  in  Washington.  This  order  carried  out, 
would  not  now  leave  at  Fort  Leavenworth  a  single  con 
pany.  I  have  companies  B  and  E  2d  Infantry  now  under 
orders  for  Washington,  and  if  all  these  troops  leave  me  I 
can  do  nothing,  and  must  retire  in  the  absi-nce  of  other 
troops  to  supply  their  places.  In  fact,  I  am  badly  enough 
off  at  the  best,  and  must  utterly  fail  if  my  regulars  all  go 
At  Washington  troops  frcm  all  the  Northern,  Middle,  and 
Eastern  States  are  available  for  the  support  of  the  army 
in  Virginia,  and  more  are  understood  to  be  already  there 
than  are  wanted,  and  it  seems  strange  that  so  many  trocps 
must  go  on  from  the  West  and  strip  us  of  the  means  of  de 
fence;  but  if  it  is  the  intention  to  give  up  the  West,  let  it 
be  60 — it  can  only  be  the  victim  of  imbecility  or  malice 
Scott  will  cripple  us  if  he  can.  Cannot  you  stir  up  this 
matter  and  secure  us  relief?  See  Fremont  if  he  has  ar 
rived.  The  want  of  supplies  has  crippled  me  so  that  ] 
cannot  move,  and  I  do  not  know  when  I  can.  Everything 
seems  to  combine  against  me  at  this  point.  Stir  up  Blair 
Yours,  truly, 

N.  LYON,  Commanding. 

Col.  HARDINO,  St.  Louis  Arsenal,  Mo. 

By  Telegraph  from  CHICAGO,  dated  17th, 

Received  July  17, 1861. 
We  need  specially,  to  fit  out  one  or  two  regiments  of  cav 


airy,  sabres  and  revolvers.    There  are  absolutely  none  in 
his  part  of  the  country. 

JOHN  POPE, 

Brigadier  General. 
To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT,  U.  S.  A.,  New  York. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  WEST, 

Springfield,  Mo.,  July  17, 1861. 

SIR;  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
special  order  No.  112,  from  Headquarters,  under  date  of 
July  5,  directing  the  removal  from  the  Department  of  the 
West  of  companies  B  C,  F,  G,  and  II,  2d  Infantry,  and  of 
Captain  Sweeny,  now  acting  Brigadier  General  by  election 
f  volunteers.  The  communication  reached  me  yesterday 
at  this  p  ace. 

I  have  been  drawn  to  this  point  by  the  movements  of 
;he  rebel  forces  in  this  State,  and  have  accumulated  such, 
troops  as  I  could  make  available,  including  those  in  Kan 
sas.  My  aggregate  is  between  7^)00  and  8,000  men,  more 
than  half  of  whom  are  three-months'  volunteers,  some  of 
whose  term  of  enlistment  has  just  expired;  others  will 
claim  a  discharge  within  a  week  or  two,  and  thu  dissolution 
of  my  forces  from  this  necessity,  already  commenced,  will 
leave  me  less  than  4,000  men,  including  companies  B  and 
E,  2d  infantry,  now  with  me.  In  my  immediate  vicinity 
it  is  currently  reported  there  are  30,GOu  troops  and  upward, 
whoso  numbc  r  is  constantly  augmenting,  and  who  are  dil 
igently  accumulating  arms  and  stores.  They  are  making 
frequent  lawless  and  hostile  demonstrations  and  threaten 
me  with  attack.  The  evils  consequent  upon  the  withdrawal 
of  any  portion  of  my  force  will  be  apparent ;  loyal  citizens 
will  be  unprottct-d,  repressed  treason  will  assume  alarm 
ing  boldness,  and  possible  defeat  of  my  troops  in  battle  will 
peril  the  continued  ascendency  of  the  Federl  power  itself, 
not  only  in  ti  e  State,  but  in  the  whole  West.  If  the  inter 
ests  of  the  Government  are  to  be  sustained  here,  and  in 
fact  in  the  whole  valley  of  the  Mississippi  large  bodies  of 
troops  should  be  sent  forward  to  this  State,  instead  of  being 
withdrawn  from  it,  till  by  concentration  there  may  be  abil 
ity  to  overpower  any  force  that  can  be  gathered  in  the  West 
to  act  against  the  Government.  Troops  properly  belonging 
to  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi  from  Wisconsin,  Michigan, 
Indiana,  and  Ohio,  have  already  been  withdrawn  to  the 
East.  The  moral  effect  of  the  presence  of  the  few  regulars 
in  my  command  is  doubtless  the  main  consideration  that 
holds  the  enemy  in  check,  and  with  them  I  may  be  able  to 
r-tain  what  has  already  been  achieved  until  I  am  strength 
ened  ;  but  any  diminution  will  be  imminently  hazardous. 

The  volunteers  with  me  have  yet  had  no  pay  for  their 
services,  and  their  duties  have  b-  en  arduous.  Their  cloth 
ing  has  become  dilapidated,  and,  as  a  body,  they  are  dis 
pirited.  But  for  these  facts  they  would  probably  nearly  all 
have  re-etilistel.  I  have  no  regular  officers  of  the  Pay  De 
partment,  nor  the  Commissary  and  Quartermaster ;  the 
affairs  of  both  the  last  are  consequently  indifferently  ad 
ministered,  from  want  of  experience.  Nothing  but  the  im 
mense  interests  at  stake  could  have  ever  indue  d  me  to  un 
dertake  the  great  work  in  which  I  am  en  gaged,  under  such 
discouraging  circumstances.  In  this  state  of  affairs  pre 
sumed  to  have  been  unknown  when  the  order  was  issued, 
I  have  felt  justified  in  delaying  its  execution  for  further  in 
struction,  so  far  as  the  companies  with  me  are  concerned. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

N.  LYON, 

Brigadier  General,  Commanding. 
To  Lieut.  Col.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  &c. 

ST.  Louis,  July  19,  1861. 

It  was  the  design  to  occupy  Southwest  Missouri,  cutting 
off  all  approaches  from  Arkansas  by  way  of  Pocahontas, 
to  occupy  Pop'ar  Bluffs,  Bloomfield,  Greenville,  and  the 
line  of  tne  Cairo  and  Fulton  railroad — accordingly  one  rogi- 
nvnt  is  at  Ironton,  ready  to  advanc3  wh  n  reinforced. 
Grant  wa^  under  orders,  but  bb  orders  wer  countermand 
ed.  Marsh  is  at  Cape  G  rardeau,  instructed  to  keep  open 
communication  witn  Bloomfield,  where  Gra- t  was  to  be. 
Gen.  Preutiss  has  eight  regiments  at  Cairo,  and  co-jld  spare 
five  of  them  to  go  into  that  country.  If  we  once  lose  pos 
session  of  the  swamps  of  thst  region  a  large  army  will  ba 
required  to  clear  them,  whi'e  if  w^  get  possession  first  and 
hold  the  causeway  a  smaller  force  will  oo.  Gen  McClellen 
telegraphed  that  he  bad  authentic  inttlligencs  of  a  large 
army  gathering  at  Pocuhontas,  according  with  what  I  have 
advised  for  weeks.  Expecting  you  here  daily  I  have  not 
telegraphed  before ;  but  it  you  do  not  come  at  ones  will 
you  take  into  consideration  the  importance  to  Cairo  that 
the  Southeast  should  be  held  by  us  ? 

CHESTER  HARDING.  JR., 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

To  Major  General  FREMONT. 


18 


ST.  Louis  ARSENAL,  July  20,  1861. 
By  telegraph  from  Cincinnati,  July  20, 1861. 
In  casa  of  attack  on  Cairo  have  none  but  Illinois  troops 
to  reinforce,  and  only  11,000  arms  in  Illinois.    Will  direct 
two  regiments  to  be  ready  at  Caseyville,  but  you  will  only 
use  them  for  defence  of  St.  Louis,  and  in  casa  of  absolute 
necessity.    Telegraph  ine  from  time  to  time. 

G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

Major  General  U.  S.  A. 
To  CHESTER  HARDING,  jr.,  Assist.  Adj.  General. 

ST.  Louis  ARSENAL,  July  21, 1861. 

A  week  since  Gen.  McClellan  telegraphed  that  he  had  the 
eame  definite  information  of  troops  crossing  from  Tennessee 
ard  comirg  up  from  all  parts  of  Arkansas  to  Pocah^ntas, 
which  I  had  leared  from  our  scents  and  f  pies  (one  of  them 
ft  pilot  on  a  Memphis  baat  which  had  conveyed  some  of  the 
troops  over,)  and  had  sent  to  him. 

Now,  in  the  Southeast  we  stand  thus :  Two  regiments, 
rot  in  communication  with  each  other;  no  artillery,  a  few 
Home  Guards,  against  what  they  expect  to  b?  20,000  men 
(regular  troops,  well  provided,)  who  design  marching  upon 
St.  Louis. 

I  have  explained  all  this  to  Gen.  Fremont,  who  will  be 
here  Tuesday,  and  who  (as  does  Gen.  Pope)  understands 
the  threatened  movement,  and  will  take  vigorous  measures 
to  meet  it. 


At  home  our  friends  are  alarmed,  and  the  city  is  uneasy. 
I  receive  about  five  deputations  per  diein,  warning  me  that 
I  ought  not  to  send  away  so  many  troops  (2,200  U.  S.  R.  C. 
left,)  and  sometimes  hinting  that  I  will  be  overhauled  by 
higher  powers  for  doint;  so.  The  only  danger  is  in  case  of 
an  advance  from  Arkansas.  But  the  first  dmocstration 
will  result  in  cleaiing  St.  Louis  of  its  secession  element. 
CHESTER  HARDING, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

To  Brig.  Gen.  LYON. 

ST.  Louis  ARSENAL,  July  23, 1861. 

By  telegraph  from  Cairo,  23d,  1861. 

Have  but  e,ight  (8)  regiments  here.  Six  (6)  of  them  are 
three  (3)  months  men.  Their  time  expires  this  week — are 
reorganizing  now.  I  have  neither  tents  nor  wagons,  and 
must  hold  Cairo  and  Bird's  Point.  The  latter  is  threatened. 
I  have  but  two  guns  equipped  for  moving.  Thus  you  see  I 
cannot  comply  with  request.  Again,  news  of  this  morning 
changes  policy  of  rebels  in  Kentucky.  They  are  organizing 
opposite.  Watkins  is  encamped  with  2,000  seven  miles  from 
Bloomfield.  He  has  no  cannon,  and  poorly  armed.  This 
may  be  the  force  you  have  heard  from. 

B.  M.  PRENT1SS,  Brig.  Gen. 
To  CHESTER  HARDING. 

WASHINGTON,  July  26, 1861. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  have  two  telegrams  from  you,  but  find 
it  impossible  now  to  get  any  attention  to  Missouri  or  West 
ern  matters  from  the  authorities  here.  You  will  have  to 
do  the  best  you  can,  and  take  all  needful  responsibility  to 
defend  and  protect  the  people  over  whom  you  are  specially 


set. 


Yours,  truly,  and  in  haste, 


M.  BLAIR. 


SPRINGFIELD,  (Mo.,*)  July  27, 1SG1. 

DEAR  SIR;  I  have  your  notes  about  matters  in  St.  Louis, 
&c.,  and  your  proceeding  seems  to  me  perfectly  correct. 
Now  that  matters  North  seem  more  quiet,  cannot  you  man 
age  to  get  a  few  regiments  this  way  ?  I  um  in  the  deepest 
concern  on  this  subject,  aud  you  must  urge  this  matter 
upon  Fremont,  as  of  vital  importance.  These  three  months' 
volunteers  would  re-enlist  if  they  could  be  paid,  but  they 
are  now  dissatisfied,  and  if  troops  do  not  replace  them,  all 
that  is  gained  may  be  lost.  I  have  not  been  able  to  move 
for  want  of  supplies,  and  this  delay  will  exhaust  the  term 
of  the  three  months'  men.  Cannot  something  be  done  to 
have  our  men  arid  officers  paid  as  well  as  our  purchases 
paid  for.  If  the  Government  cannot  give  due  attention  to 
the  West,  her  interests  must  have  a  corresponding  dispar 
agement.  Yours,  truly, 

N.  LYON, 
Brigadier  General  Commanding. 

To  Colonel  C.  HARDING, 

St.  Louis  Arsenal,  Missouri. 

[Memorandum  by  Col.  PHELPS,  from  Gen.  LYON,  to  Gen. 

FREMONT,  July  27.] 

See  Gen.  Fremont  about  troops  and  stores  for  the  place. 
Our  men  have  not  been  paid,  and  are  rather  dispirited;  | 


they  are  badly  off  for  clothing,  and  the  want  of  shoes  unfits 
them  for  marching.  Some  staff  officers  are  badly  needed, 
and  the  interest  of  the  Government  suffers  for  the  want  of 
them.  The  time  of  the  three  months'  volunteers  is  nearly 
out,  and,  on  returning  home,  as  most  of  them  are  disposed 
to,  my  command  will  be  reduced  too  low  for  effective  opera 
tions.  Troops  must  at  once  be  forwarded  to  supply  their 
place.  The  safety  of  the  State  is  hazarded ;  orders  from 
Gen.  Scott  strip  the  entire  West  of  regular  forces,  and  in 
crease  the  chances  of  sacrificing  it.  The  public  press  is  full 
of  reports  that  troops  from  other  States  are  moving  toward 
the  northern  border  of  Arkansas  for  the  purpose  of  invad 
ing  Missouri. 
To  General  FREMONT. 

ST.  Louis,  July  28, 1861. 

I  ordered  the  arms  shipped  to  New  York,  to  my  order, 
expecting  to  forward,  on  the  arrival,  to  my  department. 
I  trust  you  will  confirm  this  disposition  of  them.  The 
rebels  are  advancing  in  force  from  the  South  upon  these 
lines.  We  have  plenty  of  men,  but  absolutely  no  arms, 
and  the  condition  of  the  State  critical. 

J.  C.  FREMONT,  Maj.  Gen.  Com'g. 
To  Hon.  W.  H.  SEWARD,  Washington. 

CAIRO,  July  28, 1861,  (llec'd  ST.  Louis,  July  29. 1861.) 
On  yesterday  3,000  rebels,  west  of  Bird's  Point  40  miles; 
300  at  Madrid,  and  three  regiments  from  Union  City  or 
dered  there;  also  troops  from  Randolph  and  Corinth  The 
number  of  organized  rebels  within  50  miles  of  me  will  ex 
ceed  12,000— that  is  including  Randolph  troops  ordered, 
and  not  including  several  companies  opposite  in  Ken 
tucky. 

B.  M.  PRENTISS,  Brig.  Gen. 
To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT. 

ST.  Louis,  July  29, 1861. 

The  agent  of  Adams'  Express  Company  here  has  offered 
to  bring  me  by  passenger  train  any  arms  directed  to  me. 
Send  everything  you  have  for  me  by  passenger  trains,  for 
which  the  Express  Company  will  provide.  Your  letter  of 
24th  received.  There  were  no  arms  at  the  Arsenal  here  to 
meet  the  order  given  for  the  5,000.  WTe  must  have  arms — 
any  arms,  no  matter  what. 

J.  C.  FREMONT,  Maj.  Gen.  Com'g  W.  D. 

To  Maj.  HAGNER,  Fifth  Av.  Hotel,  New  York. 

[Un-  fficial.] 
HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

St.  Louis,  July  30, 1861. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  You  were  kind  enough  to  say  that  as  oc 
casions  of  sufficient  gravity  arose  I  might  send  you  a  pri 
vate  note. 

I  have  found  this  command  in  disorder,  nearly  every 
county  in  an  insurrectionary  condition,  and  the  enemy  ad- 
vanc.n?  in  force  by  different  puints  of  the  Southern  fron 
tier.  Within  a  circle  of  50  miles  around  General  Prentiss, 
there  are  about  riUO  j  of  the  Confederate  forces,  and  5,000 
Tennesseans  and  Arkansas  men,  under  llardee,  well  armed 
with  rifles,  are  advancing  upon  Ironton.  Of  these,  2,000 
are  cavalry,  which  yesterday  morning  were  within  twenty- 
lour  hours  march  of  Irontoa.  Colonel  Bland,  who  had  been 
seduced  from  this  post,  is  falling  back  upon  it.  I  have  al 
ready  reinforced  it  with  one  regiment,  su-nt  on  another  this 
motning,  and  fortified  it.  I  am  holding  the  railroad  to 
Ironton  and  that  to  Rolla,  so  securing  our  connections  with 
the  South.  Other  measures,  which  I  am  taking,  1  will  not 
trust  to  a  letter,  and  I  write  this  only  to  inform  you  as  to 
our  true  con:iition,  and  to  say  that  if  I  can  obtai.i  the  ma 
terial  aiii  I  am  expecting  you  may  feel  secure  that  the  ene 
my  will  be  driven  out  and  the  State  reduced  to  order.  I 
have  ordered  General  Pope  back  to  North  Missouri,  of  which 
he  is  now  in  command.  I  am  sorely  pressed  for  want  of 
arms.  I  have  arranged  with  Adams'  Express  Company  to 
bring  me  everything  with  speed,  and  will  buy  arms  to-day 
in  New  York.  Our  troops  have  not  been  paid,  and  some 
regiments  are  in  a  state  of  mutiny,  and  the  men  whose  term 
of  service  is  expired  generally  refuse  to  enlist.  I  lost  a  fine 
regiment  last  night  from  inability  to  pay  them  a  portion 
of  the  money  due.  This  regiment  had  been  intended  to 
move  on  a  critical  post  last  night.  The  Treasurer  of  the 
Unite.!  States  has  here  $300,000  entirely  unappropriated.  I 
applied  to  him  yesterday  for  $100,000  for  my  Paymaster, 
General  Andrews,  but  was  refused.  We  have  not  an  hour 
for  delay.  There  are  three  courses  open  to  me.  One,  to  let 
the  enemy  poss  ss  himself  of  some  of  the  strongest  points 
in  the  State,  and  threaten  St.  Louis,  which  is  insurrection 
ary.  Second,  to  force  a  loan  frum  seces.-ion  banks  here. 
Third,  to  use  the  money  belonging  to  the  Government, 
which  is  in  the  Treasury  here.  Ot  course  I  will  neither 


19 


lose  the  State  nor  permit  the  enemy  a  foot  of  advantage.  I 
have  infused  energy  and  activity  into  the  department,  and 
there  is  a  thorough  good  spirit  in  officers  and  men.  This 
morning  I  will  order  the  Treasurer  to  deliver  the  money  in 
his  possession  to  General  Andrews,  and  will  send  a  force  to 
the  Treasury  to  take  the  money,  and  will  direct  such  pay 
ments  as  the  exigency  requires.  I  will  hazard  everything 
for  the  defence  of  the  department.  You  have  confided  to 
me  and  I  trust  to  you  for  support. 
With  respect  and  regard,  I  am,  yours  truly, 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 
Major  General,  Commanding. 
To  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

By  telegraph  from  CAIRO,  Aug.  1, 1861. 
The  following  information  just  received  is,  I  believe,  re 
liable.  Gen.  1'illow  was  at  New  Madrid  on  the  morning  of 
the  31st,  with  11,000  troops  well-armed  and  well-drilled; 
two  regiments  of  cavalry  splendidly  equipped;  one  battery 
of  flying  artillery,  10. pounders,  and  ten  guns  manned  and 
offlcertd  by  foreigners ;  several  mountain  howitz3Ts  and 
other  artillery,  amounting  in  all  to  100.  9,000  more  moving 
to  reinforce.  He  has  promised  Gov.  Jackson  to  place  20,- 
000  men  in  Mi-souri  at  once.  I  have  a  copy  of  his  procla 
mation  and  also  one  of  his  written  passes. 

c.  c.  MARSH, 

Col.  Commanding  Camp  Fremont. 
To  Major  Gen.  FREMONT,  St.  Louis. 

Upon  this  day,  August  1,  Gen.  Fremont  went 
in  person  to  reinforce  Cairo,  with  what  troops 
he  conld  gather,  and  with  as  much  display  as 
possible,  in  order  to  increase  the  apparent  size 
of  his  small  force. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
Washington,  Aug  2, 1861. 

Since  ordering  the  two  batteries  for  you  yesterday,  it  ap 
pears  one  company  has  no  guns  and  the  other  is  in  Western 
Virginia;  neither  can  be  withdrawn.  The  order  is  roun- 
termanded  WINF1ELD  SCOTT. 

To  GEN.  FREMONT. 

[Telegram.] 

HEADQUARTERS,  "City  ot  Alton,"  Cairo,  Aug.  3, 1881. 
Order  Colonel  J.  D.  Stevenson's  regiment  to  Rolla  forth 
with.    Quartermaster's  and  Commissary's  stores  to  follow. 
Use  utmost  despatch. 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 
Major  General,  Commanding. 
Captain  J.  C.  KELTON,  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

[Telegram.] 

HEADQUARTERS,  "  City  of  Alton,"  Cairo,  Aug.  3,  1861. 
The  Commaa.UDgGeneral  directs  that  Montgomery's  force 
join  General  Lyon's  command  at  Springfield,  Missouri,  im 
mediately.     Send  him  this  order  by  express. 

JOHN  C.  KELTON, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 
Captain  W.  E.  PRINCE,  Commanding  Fort  Leavenworth. 

CAIRO,  August  4,  1861. 

Information  last  night  of  a  large  force  at  Bloomfiel  1,  re 
ported  from  eight  (8)  to  ten  thousand  (10  000  ;)  ;>t Garrison 
Mills,  on  I'ic^et  ro  d.  five  hundred  (500  ;)  at  Castor  Mills, 
five  hundred  (500;)  at  Strong  8  Mills. on  Casting  liver, five 
hundred  (;300:)  about  five  miles  above  Rt.ong  s  Mills  they 
are  herding  bt  ef  cattle.  On  Int  find  2d  August  they  had 
orders  to  cook  four  days  rations  of  bread. 

C.  C.  MARSH, 

COT.  20th  111.  Vol.  Commanding. 
To  Major  General  J.  C.  FREMONT. 

ST.  Louis,  August  4, 1S(>1. 

Yours  of  (he  4th  received  to  day.  Fee  di-patrh  to  Presi 
dent.  I  hwe  nm-'e  a  loan  from  the  bauks  here.  Send 
money.  It  is  a  moment  for  the  Government  to  put  forth 
its  power. 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 
Major  G  'nera!  Commanding. 
Hon.  MONTGOMERY  BLAIR,  Washington  city. 

CAPE  GIRARDEAU,  Aug.  4, 11  a.  m., 
Via  Joncsborough,  (received  St.  Louis,  5th.) 
Thomson  is  advancing  within  16  miles  of  me.    Am  forti 
fying  tho  hill  in  rear  of  Mills's.     Send  me  re-enforcements 
and  ammunition.     Express  waiting  for  reply. 

C  C.  MARSH,  Col.  20th  111.  Vol.,  Com'g. 
To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT. 


CAPE  GraABDEAtr,  9  p.  m.,  Aug  5, 

Via  Jonesborough. 

Enemy  close  on  me,  over  5,000  strong.  Will  be  attacked 
before  morning;  send  me  aid. 

C.  C.  MARSH,  Col. 
To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT. 

CAIRO,  August  5, 1861. 

The  following  dispatch  was  just  received :  "CapeGirar 
deau,  Aug.  4,  11  p.  m. — Gen.  Prentiss,  enemy  advancing 
within  16  miles  of  me ;  help  me  if  you  can. 

(Signed)  C.  C.  MARSH." 

B.  M.  PRENTISS,  Brig.  Gen. 
To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT. 

By  telegraph  from  the  ARSENAL,  Aug.  5, 1861. 
There  are  now  in  the  Arsenal  2,933  men,  besides  Smith's 
630  at  th.e  barracks.  Smith's  and  Color's  men  don't  know 
the  facings  and  marchings.  Ought  not  Color  to  go  to  the 
barracks,  and  should  not  the  officers  of  the  13th  regulars 
be  instructed  to  drill  both  regiments  ? 

CHESTER  HARDING,  Ja. 
To  Gen.  FREMONT,  St.  Louis. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

St.  Louis,  Aug.  5, 1861. 

1.  The  commanding  officer  directs  that  Col.  Montgomery's 
force  joins  Gen.  Lyon's  command,  at  Springfield,  Mo.,  im 
mediately. 

2.  The  force  under  Col.  Dodge,  at  Council  Bluff,  is  ordered 
to  St.  Joseph  forthwith.    On"  its  arrival  at  that  point,  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  regiment  will  report  to  these 
Headquarters  for  orders. 

J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 
Forward  these  orders  with  the  utmost  dispatch. 

J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 
To  Capt.  PRINCE,  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas. 

By  telegraph  from  WASHINGTON, 

August  5,  1861. 

The  President  desires  to  know  briefly  the  situation  of  af 
fairs  in  the  region  of  Cairo.  Please  answer. 

JOHN  G.  NICHOLAY,  Private  Sec. 
To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

St.  Louis,  Aug.,  6, 1861. 

I  re-enforce  you  this  morning  with  a  heavy  battery  ot 
24's  and  one  regiment.  Gen.  Prentiss  re-enforces  you  from 
below.  Keep  me  posted. 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 

Maj.  Gen.  Com'g. 
To  Col.  C.  C.  MARSH,  Cape  Girardeau. 

WASHINGTON,  Aug.  6,  1861. 

All  the  troops  are  ordered  out  of  New  Mexico.  The  first 
detachment  will  leave  about  the  15th.  Volunteers  received 
in  New  Mexico  are  reported  unreliable  in  defending  the 
large  amount  of  United  States  property  there.  These  stores 
cannot  be  moved  East.  There  is  danger  of  their  falling 
into  tho  hands  of  the  Texans.  Nevertheless,  the  regulars 
must  como  away  as  ordered.  At  least  two  regiments  of 
volunteers,  say  from  Kansas,  should  be  sent  without  delay 
to  New  Mexico,  with  a  competent  officer  for  the  immediate 
command  of  all  the  troops  there.  Confer  with  the  Gov 
ernor  of  Kansas,  and  arrange  for  the  salety  of  New  Mexico 
as  soon  as  possible. 

WINFIELD  SCOTT. 

To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

St  Louis,  Aug.  6, 1861. 

COLONEL  :  I  send  by  special  engine  Mr.  Ed.  II.  Cattle,  for 
any  information  you  may  have  of  General  Lyon's  position. 
Mr.  Castle  will  inform  you  of  what  progress  Colonel  Steven 
son  has  made,  who,  with  his  regiment,  is  on  his  way  to 
General  Lyon's  camp.  Communicate  to  me  through  Mr. 
C.,  who  is  instructed  to  return  with  any  information  you 
may  have — all  ot  which  jou  may  safely  intrust  to  him. 

Inclosed  letters  to  be  forwarded  as  immediately  as  possi 
ble  to  General  Lyon. 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 
Major  General,  Commanding. 
To  COLONEL  WTMAN,  Rolla. 

ARSENAL  Aug.  6, 1861,  (by  telegraph  from  Cairo.) 

I  have  just  ordered  four  companies  with  two  six-poundera 

on  board  steamer,  to  send.    They  are,  n.i  doubt,  fighting 

now.   See  General.  If  not  countermanded,  will  hurry  them 

forward.    Marsh  has  called  for  help  again.    Enemy  5,000, 


20 


and  over.    Citizens  have  left  Cape  Girardeau.    Answer  if  I 
inust  send  them. 

B.  M.  PRKNTISS,  Brigadier  General. 

ARSENAL,  Aug.  6, 1861. 

Prentiss  telegraphs  that  hot  fighting  is  no  doubt  going 
on  at  Cape  Girardeau,  and  that  he  has  on  board,  rea  ly  to 
start,  lour  companies  and  two  six-pounders  to  go  to  his  aid. 
He  asks  if  he  shall  send  them.  Please  answer  him  Ought 
he  not  to  increase  the  reinforcements.  Enemy  5,1)00 
strong. 

CHESTER  HARDING,  JR. 
To  Major  General  FREMONT. 

CAIRO,  Aug.  6, 1861. 

Colonel  Me  Arthur,  with  six  companies  and  four  field 
pieces,  left  for  Cape  Girardeau  7%  a.  m.  Will  hurry  en 
trenchments  at  Bird's  Point. 

B.  M.  PRENTISS, 

General  Commanding. 
To  Major  General  FREMONT. 

WASHINGTON,  Aug.  6,  1S61. 

Orders  have  heen  sent  Governor  Morton  to  forward  five 
regiments  to  j  our  department,  lloffoian's  battery  of  artil 
lery,  from  Cincinnati,  have  been  ordered  to  report  to  you 
for  orders. 

THOMAS  A.  SCOTT, 

Acting  Secretary  War. 
To  Major  General  FREMONT. 

HEADQUARTERS,  Aug.  6, 1861. 

Heavy  battery  of  six  tweuty-four-pounders  and  1,000 
men  left  at  midnight  for  Girardeau  under  au  experienced 
officer. 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 
Major  General,  Commanding. 
To  Brigadier  General  B.  M.  PRENTISS,  Cairo. 

BIRD'S  POINT,  Aug.  6, 1861. 

The  men  want  to  go  home,  and  if  detained  much  lunger 
the  worst  consequences  may  be  feared.    Their  time  of  ser 
vice  expired  yesterday.    Provide  for  their  return.  They  are 
of  little  use  in  their  present  spirit     I  wait  your  answer. 
ROBERT  ROMBAUER. 
Major  General  FREMONT. 

[Special  Order  No.  39.] 
HADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

St.  Louis,  Aug.  8,  1861. 

The  Seventh  Regiment  Missouri  Volunteers,  Colonel  Ste 
venson,  now  at  Holla,  will  immediately  proceed  to  Spring 
field,  to  join  General  Lyon's  command. 
By  order  of  Major  General  Fremont. 

JOHN  C.  KELTON, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

[Telegram.] 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 
[Extract.]  St.  Louis,  Aug.  8,  1861. 

Captain  Kelton  will  also  order  Colonel  Stevenson  with 
his  regiment,  now  halted  at  Holla,  to  go  immediately  for 
ward  and  join  General  Lyon. 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 
Major  General,  Commanding. 

[Rough  draft  of  a  letter  to  Montgomery  Blair.] 

August  9,  1861. 

[The  letter  as  sent  does  not  differ  from  this  in  any  mate 
rial  point.  No  copy  of  it  is  in  General  Fremont's  posses 
sion.] 

The  greater  part  of  the  old  troops,  especially  the  foreign 
element,  is  going  outof  service.  The  new  levies  are  literally 
the  rawest  ever  got  together.  They  are  reported  b,y  the 
officers  to  be  literally,  entirely,  unacquainted  with  the  ru- 
d'men's  of  military  exercises.  To  bring  them  face  before 
the  enemy,  in  their  present  condition,  would  be  a  mere  un 
manageable  mob.  I  can  remedy  this  if  I  can  be  author 
ized  by  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War  to  collect 
throughout  the  States  instructed  men  who  have  seen  ser- 
Tice.  Wita  them  I  could  make  a  skeleton — meagre — but 
still  a  frame-work  on  which  to  'brm  the  army.  This  au 
thority  ought  to  be  allowed  and  the  cost  of  tra  sportation. 
Don't  lose  time,  but  be  quick.  I  assure  you  it  will  require 
all  we  can  do,  and  do  it  in  the  best  manner,  to  meet  the 
enemy.  I  ought  to  he  supplied  here  wi;h  four  or  five  mil 
lions  of  dollars  in  Treasury  notes,  aud  the  disbursing  offi 
cers  allowed  to  sell  them  at  the  ruling  disount. 

All  such  equipments  as  I  can  procure  abroad  in  much 


less  time  than  I  could  get  them  here,  I  ought  to  be  allowed 
to  send  for. 

These  are  my  suggestions.  They  are  valuable.  Pray 
act  upon  them,  and  what  you  do;  do  quic'dy.  It  would 
subserva  the  public  interest  if  an  officer  were  directed  to 
report  to  me,  to  have  command  of  fie  operations  on  the 
Mississippi,  t^how  this  to  the  President.  The  c-ntest  in 
the  Miss  ssippi  Val  ey  will  be  a  severe  oi>e.  We  had  best 
meet  it  in  t  ie  face  a  once  aud  by  fo  doing  we  can  rout 
them.  Who  now  serves  the  country  quickly  serves  it 
twice.  (Signed)  J.  C.  FREMONT. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT  . 

.     St.  Louis.  August  13.  1861. 

Dispatch  received.  Our  so'diers  are  not  prompt'y  paid, 
partly  fro -a  the  small  fonw  of  paymasters,  in  >re  from  wait 
of  money,  wine  i  fata'ly  embarras  es  every  br  "ch  of  the 
p  ,bii3service  her '.  I  require  this  week  three  millions  for 
Quartermaster's  Department. 

J.  C.  FREMONT, 
Major  General  Commanding. 
Hon.  THOS.  A.  SCOTT,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War. 

The  following  dispatch  was  sent  to  Mr.  J. 
T.  Howard,  of  New  York,  who,  at  General 
Fremont's  request,  was  endeavoring  to  procure 
certain  arras  from  the  Union  Defence  Com 
mittee  of  that  city : 

ST.  Louis,  August  13,  1861. 

Dispatch  received;  fend  the  arms  witho  .t  further  bar 
gaining,  aud  a'so  s  n  1  your  addr  ss.  S!;ip  p:-r  A  !ams  & 
Co.'s  f-st  freight,  who  collect  here  0:1  delivery  Gx>  1  men 
are  losing  th  ir  lives  while  the  men  whom  they  defend  are 
debating  teims.  Answer. 

J.C.FREMONT, 
Major  Gener.il  Comma  ding. 
To  J.  T.  HOWARD. 

[Vol.  2,  p.  79.] 

WASHINGTON,  Sept.  14, 1861. 

On  consultation  with  the  President  and  he  d  or  Depart 
ment,  it  was  determined  to  call  upon  you  for  five  thousand 
well-armed  infantry,  o  be  sent  here  without  a  moments 
delay.  Give  them  three  days  cooked  rations.  This  Oraft 
from  your  forces  to  be  replaced  by  you  f  orn  the  States  of 
Illinois,  Iowa,  Kansas,  &c.  II  *w  many  men  have  YOU  un 
der  arms  in  your  district  ?  Please  answer  fully  aud  iniuie- 
di.tely. 

SIMON  CAMERON,  Secretary  of  War. 
To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT. 

[Vol.  2,  p.  83.] 

WASHINGTON,  Sept.  14, 1861. 

Detach  five  thousand  infantry  from  your  department,  to 
come  here  without  delay,  and  report  the  number  of  the 
troops  that  will  be  left  with  you.    The  President  dictates. 
WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
To  Maj.  Gen.  FREMONT, 

[Vol.  2.  p.  76.] 
HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

St.  Louis,  Sept.  14,  1861. 

I  am  preparing  to  ohey  the  orders  received  this  evening 
for  the  five  regiments.  J.  C.  FiiE  vlO.VT, 

Major  General  Command  ng. 
To  Col.  E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Assist.  Adj.  Gen , 
Washington  city. 

[Vol.  2,  p.  82.] 
HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT, 

St.  Louis,  Sept.  14,  1861. 

I  am  preparing  to  obey  the  orders  received  this  evening 
from  the  Secretary  of  War  for  five  regiments.  I  also  send 
messenger.  J.  C.  FREMONT, 

Major  General  Commanding 
To  Gen.  THOMAS,  Adj.  Gen.,  Washington  city. 

HEADQUARTERS  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT 

St.  Louis,  Sept.  17,1861. 

CAPTAIN:  The  Gennral  directs  me  to  say  to  ou  that  Ma 
jor  Famr,  late  of  Gen.  Lyon'a  staff,  statei  publicly  in  the 
city  that  he  came  to  these  headquarters  and  applied  for  re 
inforcements  for  General  Lyon;  that  the  reinforcements 
were  refused,  and  that  from  the  manner  of  refusal  the  in 
tention  was  to  leave  Gen.  Lyon  to  his  fate.  What  are  the 
facts  in  the  case  ?  Respectfully,  J.  H.  EATON, 

Major  U.  S.  Army,  and  M.  S. 
Captain  J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 


21 


To  which  Capt.  Kelton  replied  as  follows : 

SEPTEMBER  21, 1861. 

MAJOR:  Your  note  was  not  read  till  this  moment.  I 
have  no  recollection  of  Major  Farrar  bringing  application 
for  re-enforcements  to  Gen.  Lyon.  That  every  effort  was 
made  to  send  Gen.  Lyon  additional  troops,  after  the  arrival 
of  Gen.  Fremont,  I  do  know.  It  was  found  impossible  to 
do  so  and  keep  open  the  railroad  communication  extending 
toward  Springfield,  and  at  the  same  time  to  meet  the 
threatened  advance  up  the  Mississippi.  I  do  not  know 
anything  of  the  manner  in  which  the  refusal  to  send  rein 
forcements  was  made.  I  can  only  recall,  now,  Major  Far 
rar  in  connection  with  his  application  to  me  for  a  pass  over 
the  Pacific  Railroad  for  his  horses,  which  I  declined  after 
the  Quartermaster  had  informed  me  it  could  not  be  author 
ized.  If  I  had  any  conversation  with  Major  Farrar  on  the 
subject  to  which  your  note  alludes,  it  has  escaped  me  en 
tirely. 

Very  respectfully, 

JOHN  C.  KELTON, 
Late  A.  A.  G.,  Col.  9th  Reg.  M.  V. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  a  statement 
voluntarily  drawn  up  and  offered  to  General 
Fremont,  by  Colonel  Chester  Harding,  Assistant 
Adjutant  General  to  General  Lyon  : 

PACIFIC,  Oct.  5, 1861. 

*  *  *  *  Looking,  then,  to  the  position  of 
affairs  in  this  State  on  the  26th  July,  1861,  it  will  be  found 
that  Gen.  Lyon  was  in  the  southwest,  in  need  of  reinforce 
ments.  There  was  trouble  in  the  northwest,  requiring 
more  troops  than  were  there.  In  the  northeast  there  were 
no  more  troops  than  were  required  to  perform  the  task  al 
lotted  to  them,  while  in  the  south  and  southeast  there  was 
a  rebel  army  of  sufficient  force  to  endanger  Bird's  Point, 


Cape  Girardeau,  Ironton,  Rolla,  and  St.  Louis,  and  no  ade 
quate  preparation  was  made  to  meet  it. 

Gen.  Fremont  sent  the  8th  Missouri  to  Cape  Girardeau, 
and  the  4th  U.  S.  Reserve  Corps  (whose  term  of  service  waa 
to  expire  on  the  8th  August)  to  reinforce  Bland  at  Ironton. 
He  took  some  of  Gen.  Pope's  force  from  him,  added  to  it 
two  battalions  of  the  1st  and  2d  U.  S.  Reserve  Corps,  (whose 
term  of  service  was  to  expire  on  the  7th  August,)  equipped 
Buel's  light  battery,  and  started  about  the  1st  August  for 
Bird's  Point,  with  the  troops  thus  collected,  being  some 
thing  less  than  3,800  men,  and  being  also  all  the  available 
troops  in  this  region,  expecting  to  find  an  enemy  not  less 
than  20,000  strong. 

Subsequent  events  showed  that  the  rebel  force  was  not 
overestimated,  and  nothing  but  the  reinforcements  sent  to 
the  points  above  named  and  the  expeditions  down  the 
river  prevented  its  advance  upon  them.  Common  report 
greatly  magnified  these  reinforcements;  and  it  was  gener 
ally  believed  in  the  city,  and  no  doubt  so  reported  to  the 
rebel  leaders,  that  Fremont  had  moved  some  10,UCO  or  12,- 
000  troops  to  the  southeast,  while  in*  fact  he  did  not  have 
over  5,000  to  move,  and  was  not  strong  enough  at  any 
point  to  take  the  field  and  commence  offensive  operations. 

Gen.  Fremont  was  not  inattentive  to  the  situation  of  Gen. 
Lyon's  column,  and  went  so  far  as  to  remove  the  garrison 
of  Booneville,  in  order  to  send  him  aid.  During  the  first 
days  of  August  troops  arrived  in  the  city  in  large  numbers. 
Nearly  all  of  them  were  unarmed  ;  all  were  without  trans 
portation.  Regiment  after  regiment  laid  for  days  in  the 
city  without  any  equipments,  for  the  reason  that  the  arse 
nal  was  exhausted,  and  arms  and  accoutrements  had  to  be 
brought  from  the  East.  From  these  men  Gen.  Lyon  would 
have  had  reinforcements,  although  they  were  wholly  un- 
practiced  in  the  use  of  the  musket,  and  knew  nothing  of 
movements  in  the  field;  but  in  the  meantime  the  battle  ol 
the  10th  of  August  was  fought. 

CHESTER  HARDING,  JR., 
Late  A.  A.  G.  upon  the  Staff  of  Brig.  Gen.  Lyon. 


Manufactured  t>¥ 

eAYLORD  BROS.  f««, 

Syracut*,  N.  Y. 

Stockton,  Calif. 


